Coming to terms with Afghanistan: The BND in sight

In the Afghanistan investigative committee in the Bundestag, the BND is also being targeted. For Bruno Kahl, head of the intelligence service, there is a lot at stake.

Bruno Kahl has been traveling a lot in the past few months. The President of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) flew to the USA, Iraq and Australia in the new service aircraft, a state-of-the-art Falcon 8X business jet. It was primarily about maintaining contact with local partner services, but also about wars, conflicts and imminent dangers.

At home, the head of German foreign espionage may soon be facing one of the most serious crises to date. This week, the committee of inquiry in the Bundestag will start its work on the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan last year.

Fateful question for the BND boss

It is already becoming apparent that the BND will be the focus of particular attention. The central question will be whether the service misjudged the situation in Afghanistan at a crucial time. For Kahl, the investigative committee can thus become a question of fate.

The new federal government has not replaced the heads of the secret services so far. Contrary to many expectations, the BND, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the military counter-intelligence service have not had a merry-go-round since the general election. In addition, the Chancellor and his head of the Chancellery should have a very positive relationship with Kahl.

However, he is also considered a loyal official of the Merkel era and a close confidante of CDU veteran Wolfgang Schäuble. Some parliamentarians are therefore speculating that the Chancellery would probably “sacrifice” the 60-year-old BND boss if the political pressure increased. His departure could then be justified with the misjudgment of Afghanistan.

Dispute between the Foreign Office and the BND

Criticism was quickly directed at the BND last year. This was ensured not least by the then Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, who stated that the federal government had not expected Kabul to fall so quickly because the BND had made a different, obviously wrong, forecast. The accusation weighs heavily.

In the past, the BND has always been wrong. But since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent deployment of the German armed forces, Afghanistan has been one of the BND’s top priorities in its intelligence work. In Kabul, the foreign secret service maintained a large base with a large number of staff, it was integrated into the military structures of the Bundeswehr and NATO, and it obtained information not only on the threat of terrorism, but also on drug trafficking and people smuggling in the country. As late as December 2020, the BND warned that the Taliban were working on establishing an “Emirate 2.0” in Afghanistan.

Crisis team meeting at the Federal Foreign Office

Nevertheless, last summer the foreign intelligence service probably did not foresee that the Taliban would rule Kabul again so quickly. The meeting of the crisis management team in Berlin on Friday, August 13, 2021, two days before the Taliban took power, is a symbol of this. The BND Vice President, Tania Freiin von Uslar-Gleichen, who has since retired, was present at this appointment at the Federal Foreign Office, as were two Afghanistan experts from the service.

You should give an assessment of the current situation. In the minutes, the BND vice-boss was later quoted as saying that “the takeover of Kabul by the TLB (Taliban) before 9/11 is rather unlikely.” The Islamists were “currently not interested” in taking the Afghan capital militarily. In fact, the Taliban did not even have to take power militarily. Two days later, on August 15, 2021, Kabul fell into their hands almost without a fight.

In the crisis team meeting, the BND representatives are said to have presented other scenarios. There was talk of so-called “tipping points”, for example that the flight of Afghan government members could accelerate the takeover of power by the Taliban. These details are not found in the log. It will therefore certainly still play a role in the committee of inquiry.

What do the documents reveal?

The deputies would therefore like to have an insight into the BND’s actual assessments of the situation – but they will have to wait for that. The BND has now identified more than 22,500 documents that could be of interest to the committee of inquiry. But they didn’t get there yet. Unlike the Foreign Office, for example, the Federal Intelligence Service has so far provided the committee with hardly any files worth mentioning – probably because the BND headquarters underestimated the effort involved in the time-consuming redacting of the documents. What particularly annoys the deputies: the BND had not even started the coordination with foreign intelligence services that is important for the release of documents.

In the meantime, the team at the BND that deals with the delivery of files has been increased – from six to around 25 employees. The news service now wants to provide up to 5,000 pages per week. This poses problems for the committee, because important witnesses are to be interviewed as early as the end of September. But then many central files will still be missing. This is not a good start for Kahl either.

In particular, committee chairman Ralf Stegner, SPD, has repeatedly let it be known in the past that he is particularly interested in the role of the intelligence service. According to the other parliamentary groups, some MPs are already annoyed by Stegner’s constant finger pointing to the BND. Stegner himself, as a Social Democrat and a party comrade of ex-Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, will have to defend himself against the accusation that he primarily wants to distract from the excessive demands on the Foreign Office by troubleshooting the intelligence service.

Own investigation in the BND

The intelligence service has already conducted its own investigation, an internal audit, into the Afghanistan debacle. Several weak points were identified and suggestions for improvement were developed. When analyzing local armed forces and security forces, aspects such as morale should be taken into account more than equipment or training.

The mood among the civilian population also needs to be better analyzed, as does corruption in government systems. In the case of terrorist groups such as the Taliban, it is also important not only to take into account their military clout, but also their political skills. Ultimately, this brought the Islamists in Afghanistan a quick victory – negotiation instead of fighting.