Through his series of interviews “Fake and causes”, 20 minutes sheds light on themes around conspiracy, fact-checking and issues for democracy. 20 minutes gives the floor to researchers, associations, experts or other members of civil society to open the debate.
Conspiracy has become a leading subject in public debate, exacerbated by the Covid-19 crisis and the many alternative theories around the effectiveness of the vaccine or the origin of the virus. While the question of adherence to conspiracy theories is often approached through the prism of the supposed (ir)rationality of its supporters, the Belgian social psychology researcher Kenzo Nera suggests looking at the social causes of conspiracy mechanisms in Conspiracy and quest for identity*.
For the researcher, adherence to conspiracy theories can be explained by mechanisms of belonging and strategies for valuing social groups and the individuals who compose them. It also questions the sometimes counterproductive effects of the fight against conspiracy.
In your book you are interested in adherence to conspiracy theories through the prism of social psychology. What are the particularities and advantages of this approach?
Social psychology is interested in the influence of the presence of others, whether real or imaginary, on the behavior, thoughts and values of individuals. She is interested in the interaction between individuals and their social context. The analytical framework therefore integrates both psychological variables – for example, cognitive biases – and social variables, such as economic inequalities in society. We know, for example, that beliefs in conspiracy theories are more widely endorsed in disadvantaged areas. Social psychology is particularly appropriate for studying a phenomenon as multifaceted as conspiracy theory.
From the first pages, you also explain that you have chosen to move away from the irrationalist approach to analyzing conspiracy. What is this approach and why this choice?
The irrationalist approach to conspiracism assumes that there are, on one side, irrational people (conspirators) and, on the other, rational people (non-conspirators). This vision is in fact reversed among people who believe in conspiracy theories, who perceive themselves as the only rational ones.
I am not questioning the work which has highlighted, for example, links between conspiracy beliefs and certain reasoning biases, or between conspiracy beliefs and paranoia. But that’s only part of the picture.
One of the important lessons of the psychology of beliefs is that reasoning, in general, is a biased, motivated process. For example, we seek to protect and develop a positive image of ourselves and the communities to which we belong.
For this reason, we never adhere to a belief in a neutral way, purely based on argumentation. Studying beliefs in conspiracy theories in the light of our ordinary psychological functioning requires putting aside the presupposition that these are fundamentally irrational, or even pathological, beliefs.
Your thesis is that adherence to conspiracy theories is a self-enhancing tool for social groups, which helps restore the image of people within different groups. Can you elaborate on the psychological mechanisms at work here?
An example that I develop in the book is the question of ideologies which legitimize inequalities. The society in which we live presents itself as open, meritocratic: if you work hard, you get what you want. People of high social status have every interest in adhering to this type of ideology, because it allows them to convince themselves that their privileges have been hard-won and are therefore deserved.
Conversely, this type of ideology can be threatening when you find yourself at the bottom of the social ladder, because it makes you responsible for your misfortune. Faced with this type of ideology, we can be tempted by representations of the world which call into question inequalities and privileges instead of justifying them, and which also help to explain the situation of disadvantaged groups. Conspiracy beliefs may serve this role – it is a potential explanation for the greater popularity of these types of beliefs among members of these groups.
You explain that scientific literature has proven for some time that people from disadvantaged backgrounds are more inclined to adhere to conspiracy theories. This is explained in particular by the fact that conspiracy theories make it possible to call into question the stories which legitimize relations of domination in the social order?
Beliefs in conspiracy theories can enhance collective affiliations in two ways. The first way is that they are explanatory stories of inequalities: they allow us to explain why, for example, the powerful are powerful and why the poor are poor.
In this sense, these are the types of explanations that have something comforting and protective for people who are, again, disadvantaged. It’s a way of rejecting ideologies, narratives that will make you personally responsible for your situation.
The second source of identity enhancement is the communities that crystallize around conspiracy beliefs. Conspiracy stories can give the impression of belonging to a community of chosen ones. People who don’t necessarily have much control over the way the world works, given that they think they live in a world where occult forces control everything, but who think they are awake, unlike the majority of the population. There is something very rewarding about belonging to a community of enlightened people, who are not “sheep”.
Concerning the fight against conspiracy theories and in particular that led by institutions or dominant media actors, you also explain that it can prove counterproductive, to the extent that it reinforces conspiratorial ideas on the existence of a plot to silence them…
Combating conspiracy theories can be complicated because conspiracism thrives on its stigma. In conspiracy rhetoric, there is this idea that we want to silence them. Therefore, criticism of conspiracism can be interpreted as a sign that the conspiracists are right. Especially since these criticisms often come from the authorities, the media – and the media and the authorities are precisely the people who try to keep the population in ignorance [selon les théories du complot].
The “communities of elected representatives” which emerge around conspiratorial beliefs are protected by this type of rhetoric which allows the social cost of these affiliations to be “absorbed” in some way by making discrimination less painful.
What conclusions can we draw from this about the precautions to take when we want to fight against adherence to conspiracy theories?
This is a very complex question. I think it is in any case important to take into account the identity aspect of conspiracy and not reduce it to a question of irrationality. We have known in psychology for a long time that people who refuse a scientific consensus are not because of a problem of access to information. They have access to information. The problem here is the motivated rejection of scientific information. It is important to take into account the psychological motivations underlying this rejection, and in particular identity motivations.
One avenue in the fight against conspiracy is to work to short-circuit the possibility of interpreting the criticism of conspiracy theorists as new proof of conspiracy. I think, for example, that fact-checkers, journalists, academics, etc. would have every interest in trying to distance themselves, for example, from the obvious culprits of conspiracy theories, such as political authorities, large companies, etc. One could imagine that fact-checkers and other journalists who typically tackle conspiracy theories could communicate more about fake news disseminated by political authorities, or various political “scandals”. The challenge is to show that it is not because we criticize conspiracy that we are a “watchdog” of the system.
You also explain that contrary to popular belief, conspiracy theories are not exclusively a tool of the dominated against the dominant, but can also serve as a tool of oppression by a group in a position of domination over another discriminated group…
Conspiracy beliefs can actually be used to serve just about any interest imaginable. They can actually serve to challenge the established order, particularly when they take the form of a general vision of society, of a “conspiracy mentality” which depicts society as entirely controlled by the machinations of the powerful. But it can also be used to justify discrimination and, precisely, to reinforce the social hierarchy. An extremely telling case, that of the great replacement conspiracy theory: it is a conspiracy theory which is based on the fear of a tipping point where the cultural minority risks becoming the majority.
That being said, conspiracy theories that accuse certain minorities (for example, Muslims or LGBTQI+), also denounce the collusion of elites, journalists, left-wing academics, etc. There is always this idea that elites are complicit. This is perhaps also why the idea that conspiracy denounces above all elites is so common. But denouncing elites and calling into question the established order are two different things. We can also think of the controversies over Islamo-leftism which would plague universities: this thesis has often been defended in a very conspiratorial style. These different examples show that conspiratorial rhetoric is not fundamentally in the service of social justice and the questioning of the established order, even if it always denounces certain elites.
*Kenzo Nera is the author of the book Conspiracy and quest for identity which was published on September 20, 2023 by PUF editions.