It was an election campaign in which the dream of a world free of nuclear weapons fired the imagination. Not only the SPD and the Greens demanded the withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons from Germany. The FDP also committed itself to this goal.
If you don’t remember it, you shouldn’t be surprised. This election campaign was twelve years ago. It has been so long since FDP chairman Guido Westerwelle took up his post as foreign minister with the – at the time failed – project to obtain the withdrawal of around 20 nuclear weapons from the Büchel air base. Now the subject has come back on the agenda – but strangely enough, only after the election campaign.
In Eastern Europe, people feel acutely threatened by Russia
Quite suddenly, the negotiators of the traffic light parties are now faced with the question of how they deal with the NATO doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The SPD, Greens and FDP have left the issue out of the exploratory paper, but how much it is important to him was made clear by the SPD parliamentary group leader Rolf Mützenich through a rebuke that he gave to the incumbent Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer from the CDU. Mützenich put their demand for a credible nuclear deterrent against Russia on the same level as Russia’s “unfounded threats”.
There is much more to these words than just anger at a departing minister who exposes herself again. On the one hand, because Mützenich reiterates his doubts about nuclear deterrence, which are not new. On the other hand, because the SPD man describes Russia’s threats as unfounded. The people in the Baltic states and elsewhere in the east of the NATO area are likely to see it differently. They feel threatened by a Russia that has resorted to military force in Ukraine and whose threatening gestures seem anything but unfounded. So far, there is consensus in NATO to take Russia’s verbal and military armament seriously.
The NATO partners will take a close look at the coalition agreement
This includes the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The Bundeswehr’s white paper, adopted in 2016 during a black-red coalition, also enshrines the conviction that nuclear deterrence remains necessary as long as there are nuclear weapons. Both in Moscow and in the NATO capitals, the coalition agreement of the traffic light parties will read very carefully whether this principle still applies without restriction to the future federal government. The weights will be different than before. The SPD and the Greens view nuclear deterrence with the utmost skepticism. The FDP is no stranger to this, at least historically.
Of course, the traffic light parties will not simply ask the US to withdraw its nuclear weapons. This would plunge NATO into a crisis. They have to decide, however, whether Germany will still share responsibility through so-called nuclear participation. Here, NATO is not concerned with paying lip service, but with new aircraft capable of nuclear weapons.
The SPD, FDP and the Greens all emphasize how important the Western alliance is for Germany’s security. As in financial policy, however, this commitment is only worth something if it is covered. That would be the case if Germany took on more responsibility in the alliance. A gradual withdrawal from nuclear participation can possibly calm the conscience of individuals. He will not secure peace in Europe.