Situation in the war zone: “Militarily, Ukraine needs the defensive”

The Ukrainian offensive has failed to achieve its goals, says military analyst Gady after a visit to the front. Russia suffered losses, but Kiev’s military was also weakened. The Ukrainian armed forces would now have to go on the defensive.

tagesschau.de: You were recently on the front lines in Ukraine – what impression did you have of the current state of the Ukrainian offensive?

Franz Stefan Gady: It appears that the Ukrainian counteroffensive peaked in September and that fighting has steadily decreased since the end of that month. The geographical goals that Ukraine set for itself – the city of Tokmak as an intermediate destination in the south or Melitopol and then the advance to the Sea of ​​Azov – were not achieved in this offensive.

One goal of this offensive was to weaken the Russians’ offensive potential while maintaining their own combat power for future operations. Here we don’t have a clear picture of the attrition rates.

Some data suggests that although the Ukrainians lost some combat power, they managed to inflict very heavy losses on the Russians. In this respect – even if the geographical goals of the offensive were missed, there is another dimension here, into which one has less insight.

“From the beginning more risky Approach”

tagesschau.de: What are the reasons for this development?

Gady: There were some coordination difficulties in the opening phase. There have been too many attacks along multiple axes, making it difficult for Ukraine to mass forces.

At the same time, the combat effectiveness of the new brigades, which were formed and then trained within a few months, was probably overestimated. However, it must also be said that this would have posed major problems for every army in the world. This was a risky approach from the start and has proven unworkable. This significantly reduced the attack potential.

The offensive may also have been started too late. But here you always have to weigh things up, and every decision has its advantages and disadvantages.

“The primacy of politics applies”

tagesschau.de: Did the political and military leadership misjudge its own strengths when preparing for the offensive?

Gady: I believe that Ukraine’s senior military leadership was well aware of what the Ukrainian armed forces are capable of and what they are not capable of. Some Western partner countries probably had an over-optimistic view of the capabilities of the new brigades. But the primacy of politics still applies. This means that how the offensive is carried out on a strategic level is ultimately still a political decision.

Some political decision-makers may have had the wrong impression here. And it is likely that those who overestimated the Ukrainian armed forces gave their Western partners and the general public false expectations.

Ammunition deliveries were not crucial”

tagesschau.de: What role did the ammunition factor play in this development?

Gady: After the problems in the opening phase, the Ukrainian army relatively quickly switched back to a previously centered artillery war with the aim of wearing down and wearing out the Russian forces. And that required more ammunition than the actual idea of ​​being able to quickly switch to a war of movement after the hoped-for initial successes.

Without the delivery of American cluster munitions, the offensive would probably have had to be stopped in August because ammunition consumption on the Ukrainian side was significantly higher than expected.

However, I would like to emphasize that what is now often used as an excuse for not supplying enough weapons or ammunition was not, in my view, the decisive factor. It’s more about how these Western weapons were used.

It is true that the West has delivered too slowly and too little. But other factors were more important in the failure of the offensive. Here, sincere self-criticism is extremely important for military success.

“Russians are still a very dangerous opponent”

tagesschau.de: What strengths have the Russians demonstrated?

Gady: On the one hand, the ability to adapt, which is often denied to the Russians. They did not defend according to the classic Russian defense doctrine. The Russians decided to vehemently defend themselves against the Ukrainian attacks along the first line of defense and then immediately launch counterattacks.

This was very costly and put a lot of wear and tear on the Russian forces. But at the same time it has also made it very difficult for the Ukrainians to gradually dismantle and then break through the Russian defense lines in order to move on to a war of movement.

When it comes to defenses, they have also proven to be good defenders and are sometimes superior to the Ukrainian armed forces. Two other points are very important: In contrast to previous visits to the front, improvised kamikaze drones now often determine the rhythm of the battlefield. Russia can use this type of weapon very effectively in larger quantities than Ukraine.

And then there is the Russians’ superior strength in the area of ​​electronic warfare, because, among other things, the prerequisite is to use these home-made combat drones.

And finally, the Russians can continue to push reserves to the front and launch larger counterattacks here. The battles around Avdiivka, but also in the Kupyansk and Kremina area show that if you give the Russians a breather, they are still a very dangerous opponent with the potential for limited offensive operations.

“You can see the war in people’s faces”

tagesschau.de: How does this affect the soldiers themselves?

Gady: I believe that morale and combat effectiveness are still very high. But it is clear that the offensive potential of the Ukrainian armed forces has been significantly weakened. There are major deficiencies in the individual infantry units used for attacks.

Many soldiers are overtired, many are wounded, taken prisoner or killed. You can see the war on people after several months of counteroffensive.

That’s why I think it’s urgently necessary to move to the strategic defensive as early as possible on most parts of the front and at the same time use the next year to initiate a rebuilding year. This should be the motto for 2024 for the Ukrainian armed forces.

“The ad hoc approach must stop”

tagesschau.de: What does construction year mean?

Gady: First of all, the development year means that the individual units are well trained and trained. It means that training and education are supported more systematically by Western partners and that this happens in a synchronized manner.

The big problem is that each country has carried out its individual training programs, and this has also negatively affected the combat effectiveness of the individual brigades. One brigade or battalion may have been trained in Germany, another battalion trained by Poland, and another by countries in the Baltics. This ad hoc approach must stop, training must be good and better coordinated.

Then the individual units have to be refreshed again with additional reservists so that they can reach full target strength again. Equipment and weapon systems must be repaired, and then enough ammunition must be acquired for any further offensive operations. The Russians will likely have an advantage here in the first months of 2024.

The contradiction will be: Militarily, Ukraine needs the defensive. The question is whether the political leadership sees it that way. From a military perspective, however, the pressure on the Russian armed forces must be maintained. And this could be done through an effective campaign against Crimea, for example, and possibly smaller offensive operations along several sectors of the front.

However, it will be very difficult for Ukraine to carry out another major offensive next year under the current military conditions.

The interview was conducted by Eckart Aretz, tagesschau.de