Scholz and Baerbock: division of labor or competition?

The differences in dealing with the war against Ukraine are clear: Foreign Minister Baerbock is determined, while Chancellor Scholz is more reserved. Is the common line missing?

She has been to Kyiv – he hasn’t. If this were the only discernible difference in Ukraine policy between German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, it would probably not matter.

But since there are other clearly visible and, above all, audible demarcations, the difference in travel philosophy reinforces the impression that the Federal Foreign Office and the Chancellery do not speak with one voice.

Win or not lose?

“The goal that we all have in Europe is that Ukraine can defend its own country, its integrity, its sovereignty and that Russia does not win this war.” This is one of the Chancellor’s standard phrases. On the other hand, the Foreign Minister takes a step beyond the Scholz formula. Not only should Russia not win this war from Baerbock’s point of view, but because of Putin’s breach of international law, the Green politician is also certain: “That’s why Ukraine must not lose under any circumstances, that means: Ukraine must win.”

This is indeed a sentence that the chancellor hears again and again: from the FDP Vice-Chancellor Christian Lindner, from the head of the EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen, most recently from the heads of government of the Baltic States. He just doesn’t like to say it himself.

Different role or missing common line?

There is constant speculation about the reasons in political Berlin: doesn’t Scholz want to corner Putin too much? Doesn’t he want to block opportunities for himself to act as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia one day in the future? Or is there even a kind of informal division of labor between the chancellor and the foreign minister – according to which he doesn’t want to close doors, but can speak to them completely unencrypted.

“The chancellor has a different role than the foreign minister, as well as the defense minister. If he had the same job as we do, we wouldn’t be needed as ministers here,” Baerbock said recently about the distribution of roles within the federal government. The problem, however, is obvious: The different degrees of sharpness in the tone towards Russia give the impression that there is no common line within the traffic lights, let alone a common strategy – and they also confuse the allies.

Differences despite rapprochement

In all of this, it must not be overlooked that there are different attitudes behind it. That the Green Foreign Minister and the SPD Chancellor come from almost opposite camps when it comes to dealing with Putin: Baerbock, for example, has always considered Nord Stream 2 to be a mistake, but Scholz defended it against any criticism in December. To give just one example.

In this respect, at the latest with the much-vaunted “Zeitenwende-Speech”, the two have come closer rather than apart. Which doesn’t change the fact that the differences remain glaring now that every word is weighed. And although the chancellor recently communicated significantly more and also significantly more aggressively than for long stretches before. For example, when he defends himself against the accusation that he is only hesitant to supply Ukraine with weapons: “It’s the case that there are always reports, including some that are completely wrong,” Scholz bursts for his circumstances recently in Lithuania almost the collar.

Opposition leader Friedrich Merz also recently felt the Chancellor’s displeasure in the Bundestag. This would prove that Scholz can also speak plain language. If he wants to. So far, there has been no open dispute between Scholz and Baerbock about who ultimately determines German foreign policy. But the fact that this temporary “peaceful coexistence” will last forever is not set in stone given the very different attitudes – and temperaments.