Russia’s partial mobilization: “Putin is running out of options”

The announced partial mobilization raises many problems for Russia, says military expert Gady. In the end, she could lower the morale of the troops even further – but for Ukraine the war is “far from won”.

tagesschau.de: How quickly can the partial mobilization announced by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu take effect and have an impact on the war?

Franz Stefan Gady: Historically, Russia has only ordered mobilizations of armed forces three times in the past 120 years. In that way it is a special event. But one has to understand that Russia no longer has a military structure geared towards mass mobilization as it did in Soviet times. This makes it difficult to estimate how quickly these units can get to the front lines. In any case, this measure will influence the fighting by prolonging the war, at least from the Russian side. However, this measure cannot influence the immediate course of the war. Nonetheless, alongside the decision to start the war in Ukraine, this is certainly the most serious decision of Putin’s tenure and a clear escalation.

Three options – and their consequences

tagesschau.de: If Russia doesn’t have this structure, where could the new recruits go?

Gady: There are three options here. The first: the Russian army could create completely new units, which would be trained for a period of time and then sent into battle. Depending on the weapon type, this can take three to six months.

The second option would be to replenish the tactical battalion groups that are in Ukraine and some have only limited combat strength. But the question arises: will these units be withdrawn from combat and sent back to Russia to pick up and train with the new reservists? That would also take several months. Or will the new recruits just be sent to Ukraine one by one? This could happen within a few weeks of the basic training they are supposed to receive, but would cause major morale problems. In any case, the Russians have the problem that – unlike the Ukrainians – they cannot relieve units from the front line so that those in the rear can recover and be re-equipped. They’ve been on the front lines for more than 210 days, and experience has shown that after 200-240 days you’ll reach a kind of morale-tipping point – and that’s one of the most important elements of warfare. Here the Ukrainians have clear advantages. The problem of quantity of the Russian armed forces may be solved, but not the problem of quality.

The third option would be to use the recruits to form simple, defensive, territorial battalions that could be quickly assembled and used to hold various sectors of the front, as are already being done by conscripted units of the so-called People’s Republics. Such units could be operational within a few months.

tagesschau.de: How serious is the fact that the Russian army is not geared towards mobilization?

Gady: In contrast to many western armed forces, the Russian army does not have a central training depot; instead, the individual regiments train the so-called reservists. However, the army has sent its better-trained NCOs and officers to Ukraine. Many have died there, been captured or are missing. So who stays to train the called-up reservists? Because these are not reservists in the classic sense, as we know them from the Bundeswehr. We’re talking about people who may have completed basic training and served in the military years ago, but have not been called up for reserve exercises since then.

“300,000 reservists completely unrealistic”

tagesschau.de: And the Deficit of officers is not filled by this either…

Gady: That’s the next problem: Where will the next officer classes come from? Partial mobilization will not solve the problem in the short term. The number of 300,000 reservists is also difficult to estimate. It cannot even be estimated if the number will even get into the six figures, or if even more men will be called to the flag in several waves that will then surpass 300,000. You have to pay very close attention to what this partial mobilization does to society.

The most important thing immediately is that the contract soldiers who have only signed up for a certain period of time cannot end their service as a result of the decree – as long as the mobilization continues. That alone will lower combat morale, which is perhaps the biggest problem next to the lack of training on the Russian side. The expiry of the contracts may also be a reason for declaring partial mobilization – in addition to the success of the Ukrainians in the Kharkiv offensive.

tagesschau.de: What can partial mobilization achieve then?

Gady: The only effect is a prolongation of combat operations. New troops are added to the War of Attrition without increasing the operational capability of Russian troops. It is a quantitative approach to solving a qualitative problem within the Russian Armed Forces. I don’t think that will turn the tide for Russia.

It’s mainly about stabilizing the front before winter. Otherwise there would have been a risk that Ukraine would have made greater progress in the Donbass as well. Ukraine’s successes in Kharkiv have left a vulnerable right flank for Russian forces. The idea that Russia would now manage to conquer the entire Donbass region, as Putin ordered, has become almost impossible from a military perspective.

“Equipment deficit” in modern systems

tagesschau.de: How about equipment? More soldiers now need more equipment.

Gady: Much of the better equipment of the Russian Armed Forces is in Ukraine – much has been destroyed and there is not enough to create completely new units with modern systems. There is an equipment deficit here as far as modern systems are concerned. Older stocks will have to be used. But there should be enough left to arm the soldiers and provide them with enough ammunition for the coming months.

tagesschau.de: What does this mean for Ukraine?

Gady: One must not forget: Russia still has a material superiority – as far as weapon systems are concerned. The Ukrainian side still has enormous artillery deficits that need to be made good. In addition, we do not know how high the losses and ammunition consumption of the Ukrainian armed forces were in the recent offensive. Is there even enough ammo left to launch a second offensive? What can we as West still deliver, what are we still willing to deliver, even though the depots here are empty?

Ukraine needs medium-range anti-aircraft systems, it needs main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, it needs more artillery, but above all it needs ammunition quickly. And the Ukrainian units still need to be trained. The West still has much more to do here. If we get this right, the quality of the Ukrainian armed forces will increase over the next few months, while that of the Russian armed forces will decrease with partial mobilization. That’s a good starting point for Ukraine. But this war is far from won. Ukraine needs Western support – this is the lifeline for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

“A New Phase of the War”

tagesschau.de: The verdict on partial mobilization couldn’t have been more devastating. Is this an act of desperation?

Gady: Putin is running out of options and I think this is the first time he has realized or been informed that Russia can lose this war. Something must have happened in the Kremlin that triggered this decision. Was it the Ukrainian offensive? In this regard, a new phase of the war has entered. The partial mobilization represents an escalation, but it is also a sign that Ukraine is now closer to victory than it was a few weeks ago.

“Deliberate strategy to intimidate the West”

tagesschau.de: How much irrationality do you think Putin is capable of in such a phase? He has again indirectly threatened to use atomic bombs.

Gady: In principle, the use of tactical nuclear weapons in this war cannot be ruled out. I think the danger is very small, but in the end only one person knows – namely the Russian President. Such an attack is part of Russian military doctrine, which provides for escalation management. This also means that after dropping an atomic bomb, it does not go directly into the thermonuclear world war. In between there are further escalation levels. The greater risk is that once the sham referendums have taken place there and these territories have been annexed, the nuclear umbrella will be placed over the Donbass.

Then there is the question of what will happen if these territories are occupied or attacked by Ukrainian troops. Most states will not recognize these annexations. Under these conditions, will Putin use these weapons? What if Ukraine tries to recapture Crimea, whose annexation is also not internationally recognized? There are more uncertainties than certainties here. But I think it’s a conscious strategy to intimidate the West, and especially Germany, with this scenario.

Russia still has options to escalate conventionally: With targeted attacks on the Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. The Russian army can massively bomb Kharkiv or Kyiv, causing severe damage.

The conversation was led by Eckart Aretz, tagesschau.de