Peace talks in Istanbul: “A lot depends on the term ‘neutrality'”

Ahead of the peace negotiations in Istanbul, Eastern Europe expert Sasse explains what lies behind President Zelensky’s considerations about Ukraine’s neutrality – and to what extent the population would accept concessions to Russia.

tagesschau.de: A Ukrainian and a Russian delegation want to meet in Istanbul for peace negotiations – beforehand, the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyj made statements that can be interpreted as possible concessions. What would a peace look like that would be acceptable to Zelenskyy?

Gwendolyn Sasse: I believe that we are still a long way from having a concrete idea of ​​what both sides can really agree on. A lot depends on this concept of neutrality, which I think the Ukrainian and Russian sides interpret very differently. Selenskyj has repeatedly brought up the fact that neutrality can be negotiated – in return, there should be security guarantees with various guarantor powers for this neutrality, which is understood as freedom from alliances, i.e. non-joining to NATO. In other areas of politics, it is difficult to imagine neutrality in Ukraine – and Ukraine has already experienced with the Budapest Memorandum that precisely this model of neutrality has not worked.

tagesschau.de: What does Ukraine, what does Russia mean by the concept of neutrality?

Sass: Russia envisions Ukraine agreeing not to join NATO—probably never—nor to having nuclear weapons on its territory. That is not the case at the moment either, but it would also be formulated in this way in an agreement.

In Russia, neutrality has almost always been discussed in connection with demilitarization, and it’s unclear exactly what that means – whether what it means is that Ukraine shouldn’t have its own army to defend the country. Of course, Ukraine would not agree to that.

tagesschau.de: In principle, neutrality and renunciation of nuclear participation are points that Russia had demanded of it as “security guarantees” even before it attacked Ukraine – although the demand for demilitarization goes far beyond that, of course. So will the Kremlin get through with its tough demands, did it enforce them militarily?

Sass: In the meantime, of course, a lot has happened, and at great cost not only Ukraine, but also Russia, is now willing to discuss the idea of ​​​​not joining NATO, about “neutrality”.

When it comes to other demands, which were also in the foreground to justify the war, there are now even further differences – and at the moment I can’t imagine that the Ukrainian president will come closer: namely the demand to annex the Crimea accepting that Crimea belongs to Russia and also recognizing the areas in eastern Ukraine’s Donbass as independent and – who knows, maybe one day as part of Russia… These are Vladimir Putin’s most important demands. And Selenskyj doesn’t want to get involved with that at the moment.

Interestingly, he has now once said that if Russian troops withdraw to the separatist areas in eastern Ukraine, the status could be renegotiated; he would actually have signaled that one should return to the state before the war and start negotiations there again if Russia withdraws its troops to this area. But given the current situation, it seems very unlikely that that could happen.

Territorial cessions by referendum? “Unlikely”

tagesschau.de: Zelenskyy also spoke of an “attempt to solve the Donbass question” and admitted that a military reconquest would not be realistic. Did he de facto give up the occupied territories – and probably Crimea as well?

Sass: That is hard to say. It doesn’t actually sound like that in his rhetoric. So far I have not heard him formulate a single concession in relation to Crimea, and in relation to the parts of the Donbass, in my opinion, there has only been this one statement that if the troops withdraw, the status of these areas will be renegotiated could.

It can be seen as a concession that Zelenskyy does not seem to think that these parts can be fully reintegrated into Ukraine. He has often emphasized that the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state is at stake, and that includes Crimea and Donbass. That was the main message so far – and now there is a small opening about status negotiations in eastern Ukraine, which cannot yet be interpreted.

In any case, such signals also play a role as moves before negotiations, without making clear commitments or even responding to all three of Putin’s maximum demands. However, the underlying question is that Zelenskyy has linked a peace agreement with the plan to have it legitimized by a referendum in Ukraine. Against this background, too, it seems to me very unlikely that a loss of territory can be part of such an agreement if it has to be legitimized by a referendum.

tagesschau.de: Would the Ukrainian people accept such conditions as “peace”?

Sass: That’s the big question right now. We can also see from surveys that are currently being conducted under very difficult conditions that support for NATO in Ukraine has increased – and it was already great before the war. At the moment I can’t imagine that a neutral status, a non-alignment of Ukraine, which would then be accompanied by territorial losses, would be accepted by the population in a referendum.

Zelenskyj has already said that months can pass between a peace agreement and a referendum – and a lot will depend on the further dynamics of the war. But at the moment it seems unlikely that the population will agree to anything that goes beyond neutrality in Ukrainian terms.

tagesschau.de: Even then, not everything would be clear: the goal of joining NATO has constitutional status in Ukraine – Ukraine would therefore have to change its constitution again. Given the current circumstances, it seems questionable how a referendum can be held at all, how parliament should meet…

Sass: The Ukrainian parliament is still meeting and stresses that it is still working – but of course this is not normal parliamentary work. But even if you could still imagine it at working level, I can’t imagine a constitutional majority for such a proposal at the moment. And the population of Ukraine already looks very different than before because of the war; Last but not least, a referendum would have to give the millions of Ukrainians who have fled a voice … This is only conceivable as subsequent legitimacy after a ceasefire.

“Interesting reference to Sweden and Austria”

tagesschau.de: Even if a peace agreement were reached between Ukraine and Russia, why should Ukraine or the West assume that Russia will stick to it and not break its word and treaty this time?

Sass: To be honest, I can’t imagine that at the moment. I don’t know how one can assume that Russia will stick to a treaty – and vice versa, I can’t imagine what guarantees could be written in there that could be sufficient for Ukraine – and how they could be formulated in this way that Ukraine can count on.

tagesschau.de: … especially since Russia never appears in any negotiations as a party that is willing to make any kind of concessions.

Sass: In order for me to be able to imagine this at all, there would have to be another incentive for Ukraine to be willing to take this risk – a lot also depends on what happens in the war in the next few weeks and maybe months. The Kremlin has referred to Austria and Sweden, among others, as a model – and that is an interesting reference, because although these countries are militarily neutral and not part of NATO, they have joined the EU and are now cooperating very closely with NATO. This raises the question of whether it is possible to bring the EU into play more as a kind of political security guarantee – although of course there is no internal consensus at all in the EU about a possible accession of Ukraine.

“Russia sanctions will remain”

tagesschau.de: After four weeks, the mood in Ukrainian society has changed noticeably – disappointment and defiant hurt can be heard from many voices at the moment that NATO, the EU and others are so far removed from the war in the Ukrainian perception: “Why can’t the West admit that Ukraine has the upper hand?” according to statements, many seem to believe in a military victory for the country. What does this mean for Ukraine’s future relationship with NATO, the EU and other western institutions?

Sass: First of all, I don’t think the fact that there is a loss of confidence in individual member states, but also in the EU or NATO as a whole, does not call into question Ukraine’s clear western orientation. The fact that disappointment is currently spreading may look different in a post-war phase – because where should Ukraine be oriented, also economically, if not further west?

But what is definitely made more difficult by this at the moment is the acceptance of a compromise in these peace negotiations, which are only starting hesitantly. In fact, this makes it harder to imagine that a compromise would be accepted by the population.

tagesschau.de: What consequences can an agreement have for the West? In a nutshell: will the sanctions fall as soon as an agreement is in place and the fighting ends?

Sass: No, I don’t think so at all. These far-reaching sanctions will remain in place for a long time. Relations with Russia won’t be able to normalize at all in the coming years – I can’t imagine that. The logic of sanctions is that they can be lifted one day – but in the current situation and even after the end of the war it is difficult to imagine that the sanctions will be withdrawn – after all, they are not linked to a specific peace agreement.

The conversation was led by Jasper Steinlein, tagesschau.de.