There are dozens of books on the fiasco in Afghanistan. But none with this wealth of information and such depth of field. We are talking about the “Afghanistan Papers”, the latest publication by Craig Whitlock, award-winning reporter for the Washington Post and chronicler of the war in the Hindu Kush since 2001. He was the first to have access to more than a thousand interviews with soldiers, officers, diplomats and experts various ministries, prepared by a committee of inquiry of the US government. Whitlock then sifted through the legendary “Snowflakes”, short messages dictated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and sent down like scraps of paper over the relevant departments of the Pentagon. This only names the most important sources of a study that sets standards for all future treatises on the subject.
The author straightforwardly dismisses the tenacious thesis of nation building out of the way. Because of democratization, because of support for a future civil society in Afghanistan. The huge sums that flowed into Kabul (adjusted for inflation, far more than the Marshall Plan aid for the revitalization of Europe after the Second World War), were distributed senselessly, but above all to the wrong partners. Dubious recipients in politics and administration ran into their own pockets and blackmailed their benefactors with a well-known trick – the threat of no longer being able to prevent the collapse of the country if the flow of money were to be throttled.
It was about dollar diplomacy, not “nation building”
Washington had dealt with one nation building so not taken over. You didn’t even think about it, neither about the prerequisites, and certainly not about the goals and means. But as it was, dollar diplomacy paved the way for a kleptocracy that disavowed any promise for the future.
“We had no idea what we were actually doing in Afghanistan.” With these words, General Douglas Lute, appointed military coordinator for the region in spring 2007, criticized not only economic policy, but another disaster of similar magnitude – the strategy of the Pentagon. Donald Rumsfeld put it even more drastically: “I just can’t imagine who the bad guys are in Afghanistan.” These and other passages of the book sound so unbelievable that you have to read them several times to understand the obvious consequence: Those who cannot tell friend and foe apart kill on suspicion and measure their success by the sheer number of victims. The abundance of evidence provided by Whitlock shows not only that Washington was multiplying the number of its enemies by it. Various US governments also played into the Taliban’s cards to the extent that over time, more and more Afghans asked the obvious question of whom they should actually consider the lesser evil.
The point of the story, however, is different. It is about the fact that this mess was known and repeatedly addressed by various actors at literally all decision-making levels. And it revolves around how the bearers of the correct news have been disgraced, condemned to silence or removed from office time and time again. Instead, the staff of George W. Bush and Barack Obama launched “fake news” that is commonly attributed to Donald Trump – a concoction of whitewashing, cloudy inventions and bold lies. The announcement of the end of all combat missions, which was provided with a lot of aplomb in December 2014, is one of the particularly bizarre examples. However unrealistic, the reservoir of success stories seemed to be inexhaustible. See the fairy tale of the foreseeable equality of Afghan women or of the rise of a new middle class.
At all costs, the appearance of weakness should be avoided
But where does the continued denial come from? Why was Washington trapped in the “can’t-stop” trap? Whitlock keeps coming back to this question; it is the real guiding theme of his presentation. The range of answers is correspondingly diverse. If one consideration stands out, it is this: As so often, it was about the symbolism of the deed or the desperate effort not to let the appearance of weakness arise in the first place. Basically, a circular argument has been pumped up to strategic wisdom: You have to demonstrate determination to protect your interests. And America’s interest is to be determined. Otherwise, and thus the dogma was finally fixed, there is a risk of relegation to a lower weight class and loss of leadership skills.
The last years of the war were only dominated by this image cultivation. Whatever happened in the Hindu Kush should fall back on the US as little as possible. That is why the Obama administration flooded the country again with money for a number of unworldly projects. Whether power plants were built in the middle of nowhere, whether schools were opened in areas with no students or absurd schedules for the establishment of an Afghan army did not matter – the main thing was that time was bought to be able to say in the end that even the most generous helper had to pass if the recipient does not know what to do with the help. The reconstruction of this cynical calculation is one of the strongest passages in the book.
General Anthony Zinni, former head of the US regional command for the Middle East, East Africa and Central Asia, succinctly summarized a finding that was just as devastating for the rest of the world: “I’ve seen this film before. It was called Vietnam.” By which was meant that Washington has not only learned nothing from previous mistakes. But that there are good reasons for an even more far-reaching assumption: Anyone who gets so tangled up repeatedly has obviously lost the will, if not the ability, to correct himself.
In any case, the parliamentarians who want to take stock of the German mission in Afghanistan in the near future would be well advised to read the “Afghanistan Papers” (so far only available in the American original). Because this study does not only illuminate the engine room of American security policy. On top of that, it shows what the recent claims in the USA are that they will be able to do everything better next time.