Foreign and Security Policy: New Government, New Course?

The end of Merkel’s chancellorship probably also means a turning point in foreign policy. But what comes after that? A look at the foreign and security policy goals of the parties.

Dealing with Russia

The Russia policy is likely to remain the number 1 foreign policy headache for every new German government. Angela Merkel pursued a dual pressure plus dialogue strategy. To continue in exactly the same way, that’s what CDU Chancellor candidate Armin Laschet stands for. Just like the SPD, it would never have occurred to him to question the Nord Stream 2 Baltic Sea pipeline. Merkel said at the Munich Security Conference: “You can’t tell from the gas molecule whether it is being transported by land or sea. In this respect, it’s okay for this project to take place.”

The Greens, on the other hand, consider the pipeline to be more than a molecule transporter and a political mistake that strengthens Putin and weakens Europe. This position has not changed after the agreement between the federal government and the USA on Nord Stream 2. The FDP temporarily called for a construction break. It will be exciting to see how the skeptics behave if they become part of a government coalition but the pipeline is completed. The AfD and the Left Party are clearly in favor of the softest of all conceivable courses vis-à-vis Moscow. For the toughest the greens.

It cannot be ruled out that old tweets from CDU candidate Laschet will be dug out again during the election campaign: After the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, he had spoken of “general anti-Putin populism” in Germany. It was not the only statement that earned Laschet the reputation of a “Putin understanding”.

Economic giant China

Put simply, the same pattern emerges here as in Russia: The Greens in particular are calling for a tightening of the course when it comes to naming human rights violations. The CDU and SPD are most likely to stand for business as usual with China. However, dealing with China, which is rival and partner in one, will remain a balancing act: The USA would also like Germany to deal more robustly with China. The tendency to let the country get away with a lot is most pronounced among the Left Party and the AfD. With both parties, the position within the party is not as clear as it is with Russia.

The European Union

AfD boss Jörg Meuthen and honorary chairman Alexander Gauland had warned urgently that the party did not listen to them: The AfD now has the “Dexit”, Germany’s exit from the EU, as a target in the election program. That should bring her to explain in one or the other talk show. For all other parties, only a Germany embedded in the EU can remain a strong Germany. The Union, the SPD, the Greens and the FDP want to make Europe even more capable of acting by suspending the principle of unanimity in certain decisions. Incidentally, Europe is perhaps the only topic on which CDU candidate Laschet – who grew up in Aachen’s tri-border region – could step out of Merkel’s foreign policy shadow. Unlike Laschet, the long-term chancellor was never considered an ardent European.

NATO

The Left Party has long been calling for dissolution. She wants to transform NATO into what is called in the election manifesto a “collective security system with the participation of Russia”. Finding coalition partners for this will be difficult, no one else is questioning NATO. When it comes to money, however, opinions differ: the Union and FDP are expressly committed to the two percent target, and renew the long-term commitment to put two percent of economic output into defense. The Greens reject that. Interesting: The SPD, split on this issue, no longer explicitly condemns the objective as it did in the 2017 election program.

The Bundeswehr

Even if the Bundeswehr returns to its roots after the Afghanistan mission, which has now ended, to national and NATO alliance defense: missions abroad will remain. To the chagrin of the Left Party, which would like to end all missions. The AfD is not that fundamentally there, even if it considers the mission in Mali to be wrong.

All other parties continue to see the need for deployments abroad. Even if the Greens there – traditionally – wrestle the most with themselves. What is striking, by the way, is that the Greens have softened their years of rejection of armed drones in the current election manifesto. In certain situations they could better protect soldiers, it is now said. Quite a few see this as a signal in the direction of the CDU: A possible coalition should not fail on security issues. Inside the party, however, this could still cause turbulence.