The request from the Moldovan region of Transnistria for Russia’s protection is reminiscent of the developments that led to the war against Ukraine. But other “frozen conflicts” show that Putin takes a differentiated approach.
“Russia is a peace-loving country surrounded by ceasefires.” – This is how the satirical account “Darth Putin” on X describes the fact that conflict areas are lined up along Russia’s borders like a string of pearls.
Conflicts in regions that separated from the then emerging nation states during the collapse of the Soviet Union and led to ceasefires after brief military conflicts are referred to as “frozen”.
Blueprint for Transnistria?
However, things have remained relatively quiet over the years only in the case of the Transnistria region, which broke away from Moldova. Russia fought a war in Georgia in 2008 over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nagorno-Karabakh, which was inhabited by Armenians, is now back under Azerbaijan’s control.
Russia used the instability to de facto hold the respective states hostage and limit their sovereignty. With “peace soldiers,” Russia secured a military presence against the will of the affected states.
It seemed like a blueprint when Russia first fomented conflicts over the self-determination of the Russian-speaking population in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, then used armed forces to spark military unrest and finally annexed the areas. The fear is that Russia will use this approach to launch further attacks.
But just as the respective conflicts have developed differently over the past decades, the Russian leadership is using them in different ways. This allows conclusions to be drawn about the cost and benefit calculations of the leadership circle around ruler Vladimir Putin.
Political influence in Moldova
It is becoming apparent that Russia is currently not planning any military action to take over the Transnistria region, which has broken away from the Republic of Moldova – at least not as long as Ukraine can still hold a position against the Russian armed forces on its side of the border by air, sea and land .
Rather, Russian political influence is to be expected, as there is a presidential election in Moldova in the fall. Pro-European President Maia Sandu will then likely be challenged by a pro-Russian politician like former President Igor Dodon. On election day, people will also vote on whether Moldova should join the EU. The republic has been conducting accession negotiations since February 7th.
Request for protection also from Gagauzia
It fits into this picture that the Kremlin-friendly head of government of the autonomous Moldovan region of Gagauzia has now asked for protection and further support from Russia. However, the wording chosen by Eugenia Gutul is as vague as the request for protection from the breakaway region of Transnistria on March 4th.
In both cases there is no question of military intervention. MP Oazu Nantoi from Sandu’s party told the Reuters news agency: “The Gagauz and Transnistrians have one goal: to further destabilize the situation in Moldova.” Putin left the answer to his Foreign Ministry. He himself did not mention Transnistria in his address to the nation on March 4th.
In the case of Transnistria, companies there have had to pay customs duties to the state of Moldova since the beginning of the year if they trade with the EU. This is a significant cost for the breakaway region. This is probably the background for the request to Moscow for protection. Contrary to what many expected, this time Transnistria did not ask to become part of the Russian Federation as it had done in March 2014 and in 2006. Both times the Russian leadership did not accept it.
Option of annexing South Ossetia
The situation is comparable with the South Ossetia region, which broke away from Georgia. After the war in 2008, Russia recognized them as independent and took them under its military control. In 2022, then-leader Anatoly Bibilov announced a referendum on the admission of South Ossetia to the Russian Federation during the election campaign.
He was probably hoping for recognition from Moscow for South Ossetians taking part in the war in Ukraine. He even defended the high number of victims among his own people. But the Kremlin let Bibilov come to nothing. South Ossetia ultimately canceled the referendum.
It was also not the first attempt for South Ossetia to be annexed to Russia. But Putin is satisfied with the military presence there – 50 kilometers from the Georgian capital Tbilisi. He is keeping the option of annexation open, creating lasting uncertainty in the region while avoiding renewed international ostracism. In 2022, the Ministry of Economic Affairs in Moscow even called for South Ossetia and the other region that broke away from Georgia, Abkhazia, to become less financially dependent on Russia.
Creeping buyout in Abkhazia
Putin’s power circle has found its own solution for Abkhazia, located on the eastern Black Sea. Because its population is persistently resisting being taken over by Russia beyond the existing military occupation. However, the Kremlin is taking advantage of its massive financial dependence and investing in strategically important places such as the derelict airport, partly through business people.
Russia increased such activities in the wake of the war against Ukraine. A port that is yet to be expanded offers the possibility of transporting sanctioned goods from Turkey via Abkhazia to Russia. In addition, warships could anchor there if the Russian Black Sea Fleet comes under further pressure near occupied Crimea.
Loss of reputation in Nagorno-Karabakh
In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the conflict region in Azerbaijan inhabited by Armenians, Putin’s power circle was prepared to pay a price – namely to resolve the conflict in its existing form. When Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev waged a war to retake Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 with the support of Turkey, Putin only enforced a ceasefire when the Armenians were left with only a rump territory.
One of the terms of the ceasefire was that Russian “peacekeepers” were stationed to protect the Armenians. The leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh focused on “Russification” with the introduction of Russian as the official language. In addition, many Armenians accepted Russian passports in the hope of protection. Armenia itself was no longer able or willing to risk Azerbaijan’s attacks on its own territory and thus its own existence for Nagorno-Karabakh.
But the Armenians were severely disappointed by Russia. In 2023, Aliyev began the gradual conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Russian “peace soldiers” allowed this to happen right up to the complete capture and exodus of the Armenians in September 2023. However, this meant that they lost the mandate for their presence on Azerbaijani soil. According to media reports, some of the military equipment and 2,000 soldiers have now been withdrawn.
In addition, Russia lost its status as Armenia’s protecting power. The country remains economically and militarily dependent on Russia. But the government in Yerevan is doing everything it can to reduce this dependency. Other states in the region are following this development closely with regard to their own relationship with Russia.
Putin is clearly willing to pay this price because he sees Azerbaijan as a more important strategic partner in the region and wants to avoid an open confrontation with Turkey. Russia is also concerned with stability in the region, from which a conflagration can still develop. This could in turn endanger the infrastructure that Russia needs as an alternative route to Europe.
For Putin, Ukraine has outstanding historical, political and strategic importance compared to its other neighboring regions. As long as Putin keeps his options open there, the people affected will remain “hostage”.