analysis
For the first time since the pandemic, China and Germany are meeting for consultations. The federal government now has a national security strategy. But what does that mean?
Geopolitically, China is undisputedly a colossus. Measured against this, the federal government gives the economic and military giant minimal space in its national security strategy. A few sparse lines of a more general nature in the 76-page work – that’s it. Those who had hoped for more must console themselves with the fact that the traffic light coalition wants to follow the security strategy with a China strategy – which, however, is not yet complete. But can this work? A country like China, albeit for the time being, in a few lines?
In its dealings with Beijing, the federal government has long been guided by a triad, which some coalition politicians also jokingly call the Trinity. From a German perspective, China is three things at the same time: partner, competitor and systemic rival. Although, according to the National Security Strategy, “the elements of rivalry and competition have increased in recent years.”
autocracies versus democracies
A gradual shift in weight has taken place here. To the negative. Or – to paraphrase Finance Minister Christian Lindner: “China is a trading partner, but a rival in terms of values”. The fact that Beijing openly invokes and sometimes celebrates its partnership with Russian President Vladimir Putin has reinforced this impression of rivalry.
What does that mean for the practical handling of the giant? Chancellor Olaf Scholz speaks of a constant “balancing”. In some fields – keyword partners – a cooperation is not only possible, but inevitable. For example in climate policy. There are “intersections here, and large ones at that,” emphasizes Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. Saving the climate and not talking to China: impossible. This is likely to be a focus of the government consultations.
At the same time it is obvious – keyword rivalry – that the one-party state in the global competition between democracies and autocracies is not on the side of Germany, the EU and the USA – is probably even further away. The fact that until yesterday it was not at all clear whether journalists would be allowed to ask questions at all at the German-Chinese government consultations speaks volumes.
economic dependencies
When asked how to deal with China, which is so far away in terms of democracy and human rights issues, and how “balancing” can succeed here, the German government keeps saying: “We don’t want de-coupling, we want de-risking. ” That’s what Chancellor Olaf Scholz says. De-coupling can best be translated as decoupling. In other words, it would be wrong to sever all economic ties with China.
However, they do want to minimize risks and ensure that they do not become too dependent on raw materials or sensitive IT components, such as mobile phone networks, and thus become susceptible to blackmail. The same mistake as with energy dependence on Russia should not be repeated. That sounds correct at first. But that’s just the beginning of the balancing act.
The dispute over the participation of the Chinese state-owned company Cosco in the port of Hamburg has shown how much struggle is being made to find the right course within the traffic light. The economic wing of the SPD recently accused Annalena Baerbock’s Foreign Office of taking an anti-China course. The situation is similar at the EU or transatlantic level: French President Emmanuel Macron wants a much gentler course than the USA – also on the Taiwan question.
France more cautious, USA sharper
No matter how much the Chancellor invokes international harmony: “If you heard the American President at the G7 summit in Hiroshima, then that sounds exactly like we wrote it down here,” emphasized Scholz, referring to the security strategy. Joe Biden does indeed speak of de-risking when dealing with China. At the same time, it is hard to deny that the US wants Germany and Europe to take a clearer course.
But if you consult the National Security Strategy, it is formulated in such a vague way that Germany could easily place itself under both the more cautious Macron and the sharper United States. So it shouldn’t be a coincidence that the new China strategy isn’t ready yet – because it looks like the traffic light coalition has yet to find its role in dealing with the Asian colossus. The balancing act has only just begun.