The rejection on Monday by the National Assembly of the immigration bill at first reading is the government’s biggest failure since 2022, perhaps even since 2017. However, it does not yet quite sign the death knell of the project led by Gérald Darmanin. 20 minutes lists the different hypotheses on the executive’s table, from the most probable to the most kamikaze.
The most likely hypothesis: the Joint Joint Commission
This is, at this time, the option that seems favored by the executive. But what is it, then ? In the procedure chosen for the adoption of the immigration bill, after a reading in the Senate and a reading in the National Assembly without both having agreed on the same text, we leave in a joint joint committee (CMP ) to try to negotiate an agreement. In this CMP, we would find 7 senators and 7 deputies, in proportion to the political balance of each chamber. In what looks like a black box and where the government is theoretically not present, we negotiate step by step on each article to try to find a wording which receives the consent of a majority of the CMP. If there is agreement, the CMP is said to be “conclusive”, the text must be adopted as such by both chambers.
In this CMP, the most numerous are the LRs. With the Macronists, they have a majority. If the Macronists want an agreement, that simplifies the negotiation. But inevitably, we are heading towards a text which will more closely resemble that of the Senate – therefore toughened – than the one that came out of the commission in the Assembly at the beginning of December. And the risk during the vote in the Assembly on the possible text of a conclusive CMP is the fracturing of the majority, with a left wing abandoning the government.
Many, especially on the left, do not believe this hypothesis and think that the left wing will fold: “A snake, with a little salt and a little parsley, goes very well. » But the risk taken is still very significant. Others believe that a conclusive CMP would be a miracle because the Senate text includes 145 articles. “That means 145 standoffs (…) An insurmountable disagreement on a single article and the CMP is inconclusive, therefore yet another failure. (…) Are you going there? I think carefully before trying…”, judges François Malaussena, a socialist parliamentary collaborator, on Twitter.
The default hypothesis: referral to the Senate
If the government does not convene a joint committee, the parliamentary shuttle will resume its normal course. In this case, after the rejection by the Assembly, the immigration bill returns for a second reading in the Senate, on the basis of the text voted by the same Senate at the beginning of November. On paper, the upper house could therefore send the same text back to the Assembly, and repeat?
Not so simple, because in this option, the government no longer has complete control. The Senate can absolutely choose not to put the immigration bill on the agenda, and therefore send it to limbo. It is the conference of the president of the Senate which will decide. Knowing that the three left-wing groups do not want the text, and that it is difficult to see Bruno Retailleau, the president of the LR group, the most important, making this gift to the government, the matter is off to a bad start.
The “butchery” hypothesis: the cut-up text
Certain voices are heard in the majority, such as that of the president of the Renaissance group, Sylvain Maillard, to cut the immigration bill into several pieces. Part with the regularization measure, possibly voted on with the help of part of the left. Another part with tough measures, voted with the right. It has already worked in the past: a year ago, the government cut its energy text in two. He voted with the right for the text on nuclear power, and with the abstention of the socialists that on renewable energies.
The question of a similar cut to the immigration text was also raised last spring. We know the rest. The cut in a way puts pressure on the oppositions. But after Monday’s defeat, isn’t it already too late?
The open-country hypothesis: the withdrawal of the text
This is the option which, to date, appears to be excluded by most Macronist executives. It is difficult to abandon a text on which so much political capital has been invested for more than a year. A withdrawal would also undoubtedly sign the end of Gérald Darmanin’s lease at the Ministry of the Interior. However, even defeated, the “first cop of France” undoubtedly retains more political weight than three quarters of the government combined, difficult to do without it for Emmanuel Macron.
A withdrawal could also signal the end of Macronist hopes of passing major reforms by the end of the five-year term. A perspective that is also difficult to accept… three and a half years from the normal end of the legislature. Some voices, more optimistic on this point, urge us to move on to something else, like Charles Sitzenstuhl: “We have known it from the beginning, it is a cursed text, poorly handled. We must move on, this text has been weighing down the five-year term for a year. There are plenty of other public policies! »
The kamikaze hypothesis: the dissolution of the Assembly
In the Constitution, nothing legally obliges the President of the Republic to dissolve the National Assembly, and therefore to organize early legislative elections. Even the vote on a motion of censure, which brings down the government. But if the president, who is the only one to decide, judges the situation to be blocked in Parliament, then dissolution may be the only solution. But is the situation blocked?
Not sure: the executive quite often congratulates itself on having passed more laws since June 2022 than during the same period during its first mandate. The failure of a text in a context of relative majority does not amount to a blockage. And then to dissolve, we must have the hope of emerging strengthened by a return to the polls. And by embarking on a short campaign on immigration, while the RN seems to have the wind in its sails, the political opportunity seems, let’s say, daring.