It starts with not starting. The witness Daniel S., ex-compliance head at Wirecard, arrived at nine o’clock sharp in the hearing room of the Higher Regional Court in Munich. Now he’s standing there in a blue suit and red socks, waiting. The strike and the congested streets in Munich mean that the defendants and their lawyers do not make it in time. It takes more than an hour for them to arrive. It is a surprising picture: Markus Braun, the ex-Wirecard boss and main accused, is handcuffed by a police officer. Almost all of the negotiations so far have taken place in the prison in Stadelheim, where Braun is being held. He always came there without handcuffs.
The statement by the former compliance chief S. is explosive. After all, he was in a central position at the Aschheim payment service provider, which collapsed in June 2020 because alleged assets of 1.9 billion euros in Asia simply did not exist. S., 40, started at Wirecard in 2013 in the legal department, it was his first job as a lawyer. He soon received more important tasks. Finally, in 2019, he was tasked with leading a new compliance department. She should ensure that the company complies with the law and otherwise behaves well.
Ss stories give an insight into a group that was apparently built like a castle in the air. The board of directors – headed by boss Markus Braun and the man for the rough, Jan Marsalek, who is on the run – did everything to protect the facade of the castle in the air to the outside world. That also meant: As soon as people like S. from the legal and compliance department had objections or wanted to take a closer look somewhere, they were blocked. The legal department was an “advisory institution” within the group, but had “no veto power,” says the ex-compliance boss.
Must answer in court: the former Wirecard CEO Markus Braun.
(Photo: Sven Hoppe/dpa)
S. was often slowed down from above. “It wasn’t an organization geared towards control processes,” he says. When there were discrepancies with two partners in Asia, the head of compliance initially took over the investigation. He flew to Singapore and hired a law firm to take a closer look at the case. However, he was later “taken out” of the investigation. Marsalek took over.
When things got tighter and tighter in 2020, the supervisory board requested a special audit from the business company KPMG, in addition to the regular audit by the auditors from EY. This was supposed to relieve the group, but ultimately led to its collapse because KPMG discovered the two billion euro hole. “Obtaining documents was difficult, finding people for appointments was difficult and took longer than expected,” says S.
Then he reports on a bizarre trip to Manila, which he completed with the examiners. It should be used to talk to the new trustee Marsalek appointed. This should be the missing 1.9 billion euros. His bank consisted of just three or four counters on a “Third World Street,” as S. puts it. He could not give the examiners any receipts for the money.
What does the statement mean for the main defendant Braun? At its core is the question of whether the invented deals in Asia were solely the business of the fugitive Marsalek and whether Braun himself knew nothing about all of this, as he claims. As of Monday afternoon, there was no statement from S. directly incriminating Braun. His body language alone shows how nervous he is. He keeps opening and closing his mouth as if he’s gasping for air, and often grabs his stomach. Although he has nothing else to do but sit, his complexion gets redder as the day goes on. The questioning of S. continues this Thursday.