Israel and the terrorist group Hamas have been preparing for this war for years. The Israeli army will not shy away from brutal measures or its own losses. Hamas cannot win, but that is precisely its goal.
Israel advances on the ground into the Gaza Strip. Hamas’s resistance has so far been muted. It was expected that the terrorist group would not try to defend “its” territory and would prevent the IDF – Israel Defense Force – from entering the Gaza Strip. This is not a given; the terrorist group IS tried to hold on to its “national territory”. Without success. In Mosul and other places, IS positions in the city were destroyed, killing most of the fighters. Hamas does not want to make this mistake. She wants to be an invisible enemy and not show herself openly. From the reasonable assumption that every known position or fortification will be bombed by the Israelis.
No war without losses
Both Israel and the USA prefer a long-range battle in which they can use jets or drones against which the opponent has no defense. This makes war possible without any personal losses. Hamas does not want to provide a target for this. The fighters cannot oppose the IDF head-on; they want to let them into their territory and then strike by surprise. Hamas has prepared well for this war. The problem is that Israel expected this war and has also developed tactics.
First to Hamas. Hamas has significantly upgraded its equipment. The days of fighting tanks with RPGs (Rocket Propelled Guns) from the 1960s are over. Hamas has weapons that can destroy any Israeli tank. These weapons are often Iranian replicas of Soviet or Russian systems or replicas of Hamas itself. The text remains with the names of the originals.
Powerful tank killers
First of all, the 9K135 Kornet should be mentioned – it roughly corresponds to the American TOW. The rocket is launched from a tripod frame and guided to the target by a laser beam. The target must be illuminated by it for the rocket to hit. There are different warheads for them, both against tanks and against infantry. The system has a long range. If the rocket hits the tank in a suitable place, its destruction is inevitable.
To ward off this threat, Israeli battle tanks have the active defense system – known in Europe as Trophy. It is supposed to shoot down the incoming missile at the last moment. But Hamas has developed its own technology to combat this. Two rockets are combined in a twin launcher. The second follows the first at a minimal distance so that the Trophy System cannot reload.
The Kornet is an extremely dangerous, long-range weapon. However, she does not find her ideal field of operation in the Gaza Strip because the distances are short. The weapon itself is handy compared to a howitzer, but still heavy and noticeable. Given the Israelis’ aerial surveillance, the range of uses is limited, but it could be shot down from apartments in high-rise buildings. Their range would cover large zones of the Gaza Strip if operators could find a line of sight to the target.
Short-range combat
In addition to the Kornet replicas, Hamas has smaller tank killers that roughly correspond to the Bundeswehr’s bazooka. This is how the RPG-7 was spotted. A fighter can carry these weapons; they have a double warhead that basically penetrates any armor, especially if the tank is attacked from the side or from behind. For these weapons there are also bunker-busting warheads and those against infantry. This weapon is ideal for fighting in tight spaces. It does not need to be set up and is therefore extremely mobile. Hamas also has imported and home-made portable anti-aircraft missiles (Manpads). It is unclear how powerful these systems are. The IDF will probably only be able to provide air support to ground forces with guided missiles and not with the helicopters’ on-board machine guns and automatic cannons.
Structure of the underground fighters
So the arsenal is there. Hamas will not have stored its weapons stocks in large warehouses, but in many small hiding places. There will also be no consistent command structure like in the military. The danger would be too great that the Israelis would get hold of a commander alive and reveal the entire structure under intensive questioning. Instead, there will be small operational groups trained to act completely autonomously. A method that underground fighters have been using since the Second World War. Hamas is helped by the fact that its war aim is very simple. The idea is to resist for as long as possible and kill as many Israelis as possible. This does not require coordinated operations by large groups. There is no need for a breakthrough to occur, no bandage to be broken. It is sufficient if individual vehicles, armored personnel carriers or shelters are regularly switched off.
Guerrilla and the water
That would be the classic guerrilla tactic. However, it will not work out as the terrorist group had hoped. Because the Israelis are smarter and more determined. Mao Zedong summarized the essence of guerrilla warfare in a famous sentence: “The revolutionary swims among the people like a fish in water,” he said. The sentence romanticizes, but captures the essence of the fight. The underground fighter must be able to swim in water that protects him because he would lose in open combat. This water is the support of the population – whether out of free heart or fear – but it is also the environment. The jungle protects the Viet Cong, the cities protect the Chechen fighters, the uncontrollable suburbs protect the revolutionaries in Central America. Israel’s strategy is already apparent: the IDF is draining the water in which Hamas can swim. And there is nothing Hamas can do about it.
Gaza is small
In conflicts between regular soldiers and underground fighters, the problem was always that the soldiers were too few to really control the area of the guerrilla fighters – the jungle, the cities. The army could strike selectively, but as soon as the troops were withdrawn, the region belonged to the enemy again. But the Gaza Strip is not an endless sea; Hamas swims in a modest pool. Israel will continually shrink this basin. The northern part of the strip is currently enclosed and separated from the southern one. Avoiding the heavily built-up areas of Gaza City, the IDF is working its way along the beach and in parallel trying to split the strip into southern and northern parts along a zone of fields.
In addition, there are bombed zones that are just a desert of rubble. Once the encirclement is over, the IDF will further divide the northern Gaza Strip through rubble zones under Israeli control. Without a significant supply of water and food, the civilians will have to leave, even if they haven’t left yet. Or the IDF will clear block by block and deport the residents. Neither Israel nor other countries want to take in refugees, but the division will simply deport them to the southern part of the Gaza Strip. This deprives the terrorists of both urban space and the protective shield of civilians. The IDF will or should avoid real house-to-house fighting. Israel will take its cue from the – ruthless – actions of the USA in Fallujah, Operation Phantom Fury. To put down the uprising, the U.S. leveled every block from which shots were fired with bombs and artillery. It didn’t matter who was inside. The entire city was declared a death zone – fire free zone. Because of the hostages, commando operations cannot be avoided.
Netanyahu will not shy away from any measure
Hamas will fight back. But they cannot defeat the IDF, they can only inflict losses on the army. Israel will suffer heavy losses after the terrorist attack by Hamas. The military leadership has already announced heavy losses, this is not an operation that was sold as a walk in the park. Hamas’s mass murder of Israelis has made operations that were previously taboo politically possible. For example, when entire blocks of civilians are bombed out in order to hit a Hamas leader. After the unprecedented act of terror, Hamas cannot rely on Netanyahu’s government to shy away from anything – neither from its own injuries nor from innocent civilians.
Hamas wants to lose militarily
As described above, Hamas has no long-term military chance and the Gaza Strip will be lost to them. But as always in the Middle East conflict, the next twist awaits behind every bend. Hamas has priced in military defeat, as wiser politicians in the West have already realized. The Hamas leadership has its eye on the political stage. The reckless approach will also horrify staunch supporters of Israel. Many states, and not just die-hard enemies like Iran, will view this war as contrary to international law and a clear war crime. This operation will also repel the population in the supporting states. The division between the West on Israel’s side and much of the world will deepen. The rapprochement between Israel and some Arab states will be set back by decades. The price for victory in Gaza is also high for Israel.