exclusive
For years, covert influence by foreign states was hardly taken seriously in Germany. According to information from the government and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution WDR and NDR now stepping up against it – but how?
It can be certain keywords under which fake news is spread en masse on Twitter and other social networks. About alleged election fraud. Or reports about plans by the federal government, which in turn are fictitious. It may also be about covert actions, such as the founding of clubs or organizations and clandestine cash flows to parties or individual politicians.
The German security authorities suspect that other states and often their secret services may be behind such activities. They describe this procedure as an illegitimate measure of influence – and look for information from it WDR and NDR increasingly a threat to local democracy, to the foreign policy of the Federal Republic and to Germany as a location for business and science.
In the next few weeks there will be three official documents that will deal with such influence: the national security strategy, the report on the protection of the constitution and then soon the federal government’s strategy on China.
Win over active and ex-politicians for Chinese interests
According to information from WDR and NDR the Office for the Protection of the Constitution assumes that China is trying to win active and former politicians over to Chinese interests or to put them under pressure in the event of criticism. According to the findings of the domestic intelligence service, China is also trying to instrumentalize representatives of German business for Chinese goals, thereby exploiting its dependence on the Chinese market.
According to the research, new strategies were recently developed within the federal government on how to react to covert operations, especially from Moscow and Beijing. Structures and working groups that were only created a few years ago should be used more intensively so that ministries and authorities can identify disinformation campaigns and possible influence at an early stage.
In 2016, the federal government launched the so-called AG Hybrid – officially a “strategy, analysis and resilience unit”. It is based at the Ministry of the Interior. But their task is the equal exchange of information between different departments and their security authorities. The goal: information should flow quickly. Now that the government has spoken out against a National Security Council, the importance of AG Hybrid is likely to increase.
Initially, the AG worked primarily strategically: in addition to regular management reports, analyzes and scenarios were also developed. The AG Hybrid became really well-known through a paper on how migration can be exploited by states – which was immediately evident in Belarus.
Strong operational involvement
Since the war in Ukraine, however, the AG has also been heavily involved operationally: after all, disinformation campaigns accompany the war. The question of the possible consequences of an energy shortage – or the protection of critical infrastructure – has also been central since the beginning. The AG therefore reports directly to the Ukraine crisis management team.
In addition to Russia, AG Hybrid is primarily focusing on China. For example, the experts keep dealing with possible dangers from Chinese investments, such as in the port of Hamburg, or with Huawei’s participation in the 5G expansion.
Internal drafts of the China strategy, which is expected soon, apparently also point to a stricter view of Beijing. One observes “forms of influence that are covert, use intimidating or coercive means or serve goals that run counter to the interests of Germany ….” The Foreign Office therefore noted in the draft: They are aiming for a tightening of the lobby register at the Bundestag. Anyone who does lobbying on behalf of foreign bodies must make this transparent.
The chairman of the parliamentary control body, Konstantin von Notz (Greens), sees a lot of catching up to do: “Germany urgently needs to position itself better and more resiliently and significantly reduce its dependencies on autocratic states,” says von Notz. The Federal Republic is “only insufficiently protected against certain security policy threats” – such as attacks on the IT infrastructure, disinformation campaigns or influence by state actors.
This sharpening follows the changed risk assessment by security authorities in Germany, but also in other western countries – Canada, for example, is currently examining possible interference by China in past parliamentary elections.
Expelled more than 500 spies
In recent years, the conflict with Russia in particular has made it clear that investigating foreign espionage has obviously been neglected. This is where action is being taken more often: since the outbreak of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, more than 500 spies have been expelled across Europe.
However, because actions of influence are often about much more than individual spies, the focus is now increasingly being placed not only on classic spying actions but also on political influence and destabilization operations by foreign states.
In the national security strategy of the federal government, which was presented last week, this so-called hybrid threat is explicitly mentioned several times. According to the government, some states are trying to undermine the international order based on international law. In relation to other states, they “increasingly use targeted attacks on their freedom within the framework of hybrid strategies and try to exert illegitimate influence on political processes, public discourse and elections”.
An internal report by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution said two years ago that the “fight for people’s minds and hearts through influence, disinformation and propaganda” is playing an “increasingly important role” for many states. China, for example, is trying to create a “benevolent political, social and economic environment abroad” through “extensive influence”. Russia, on the other hand, has “changed the course of its influence activities” since 2017 and is proceeding “clandestinely”.
Looking for new tools against fake news
Meanwhile, the federal government is trying to identify attempts at destabilization at an early stage – for example through targeted disinformation or fake news on the Internet. Since 2018, the Federal Foreign Office has been using the “Talkwalker” IT tool from the provider Radiosphere for such systematic monitoring. The contract has now expired and a new tool is being sought.
According to the tender documents for the new software, the aim should be to analyze social networks in order to “determine indications of orchestrated, automated or otherwise manipulative influence”.
The aim is “to identify disinformation campaigns and propaganda by foreign state and state-related actors at an early stage”. So faster than before.