There is anger in Germany, the AfD is on the rise and the federal government no longer understands people. Three starting points on how the traffic light can slow down the anger spiral.
By Gerrit Richter
Right-wing populists in the government: Italy has had them, Hungary and Poland have had them for a long time, Sweden and Finland now too, and there wasn’t much missing in Spain. The previously unthinkable is now also being discussed in Germany: Is it possible that sooner or later a right-wing populist party will come into government here, if not in the federal government, then at least in individual states?
The question is not easy to answer. Every country is different and the reasons for the rise of the right in Europe are as different as their leaders and history. But all countries have one thing in common: anger is rising.
It is also the predominant feeling in Germany: four out of ten Germans say in autumn 2023 that they feel anger.
Anger does not automatically translate into votes for right-wing parties, but the connection is obvious: while only twelve percent of Green Party voters describe themselves as angry, the AfD figure is 67 percent. The AfD is the manifestation of the angry citizen in real politics.
The populists’ trick, the government’s dilemma
Behind this lies a strategy that always follows the same pattern among right-wing populist parties across Europe: They polarize and escalate issues until the public impression arises that a problem is incredibly big and the government cannot solve it. Populists want to make crises – within the existing institutional framework – appear insoluble. In this way, they further confirm the feelings of those who are overwhelmed and angry. Unsolvable crises pay into the populists’ electoral account via the detour of anger. The crisis feeds the crisis.
And sometimes the crisis is fueled by those who actually want to solve it. Take climate, for example: A clear majority of Germans not only consider climate change to be a real danger, but also support decisive political action to overcome the crisis.
Actually good conditions for the desired new regulation of the Building Energy Act this year. But the opposite is the case: it has been a long time since public resistance was as great as it was during the heating transition. If you ask German citizens, it is not necessarily the case that they reject the renewal of the heating systems, but more than two thirds say that they feel overwhelmed by the planned regulations. The next fodder for anger.
This situation is a strategic dilemma for the federal government. If it tackles the crises of the time too decisively and quickly, it can easily happen that people feel even more overwhelmed. If she doesn’t act, the crises will remain and worsen.
And now? The predecessors of the current federal government seem to have better understood this strategic dilemma and the psychological state of the Germans. Angela Merkel avoided any polarization because she knew that problems had to appear small and solvable so that they didn’t overwhelm people.
Her actions were often criticized as Teflon politics – you simply couldn’t argue with her in public, everything rolled off of her. Because she seemed to have recognized that big problems only help the opposition or, in the worst case, even the right-wing populists. Even Gerhard Schröder suspected this – even if he didn’t always act that way – and once coined the term “policy of the steady hand”.
The traffic light presents an overwhelmed picture
Three principles can be derived from this for the current government: First: The most important principle must be to communicate about problems – whether climate change or economic growth – in a less alarmist and confrontational way. Problems should remain emotionally manageable. Escalating problems helps right-wing populists in particular. Instead of talking about “difficult situations,” the Chancellor could also talk about “we can do it.”
Second: It is not easy to assess the coalition’s internal dynamics from the outside, but the Lisa Paus case seems to be another case in a longer chain of damaging escalation in the government. Merkel’s policy without polarization was also possible because the list of her power-political victims is long: Kohl, Schäuble, Koch, Merz, Wulff, Röttgen – to name just the most important ones. Only a few have dared to dance on the proverbial table under her.
Olaf Scholz is the opposite: He is so loyal that only one in five Germans perceives him as a strong leader. Habeck and Lindner don’t do much better. Creating discipline in a three-party coalition is a Herculean task, but without it it won’t work.
Third: When it comes to discipline, it can help if the progressive forces in the government do not lose sight of their responsibility for democracy. It is often rumored among left-wing and progressive forces that it is the supposed flirtation of the bourgeois parties that makes the AfD strong.
That is certainly only partly true: the rise of the right can also be traced back to the overwhelmed image that the traffic lights portray. It scares the Germans and many are angry. Political leaders who are considered to be weak in leadership and ministers who kick each other in the shins are the mixture from which the AfD’s dreams are made.
About the author: Gerrit Richter is co-founder and managing director of the opinion research institute Civey.