Delivery of long-range weapons
Discussion about the Taurus: The missile can’t do anything without data – and this is where the problem lies for Scholz
The Taurus is considered one of the best cruise missiles of its kind.
© MBDA Germany
In order for the Taurus to strike effectively, it needs to be fed with data from which an exact three-dimensional landscape model can be created. Kiev does not have this data; the missile will not fly without Germany. That’s why Scholz doesn’t want this participation.
There have been reports about the German Taurus cruise missile for months. How fast it is, how far it reaches, how effective the tandem warhead is against hardened targets, what clever routes the missile can choose on its final approach – the question of how the miracle weapon is actually used is much more terse. On the one hand, that’s normal. The audience also prefers to stick to tangible superlatives; the complicated details with which target radar systems differ from one another are only understandable to a specialist audience and very interested laypeople. It is the electronics that make the Taurus so dangerous.
Taurus: then and now
But the crux of the Taurus isn’t the range, it’s the electronic background. To illustrate, here are two examples, one old-school and another from today with a slight look to the future. This is how air raids were planned in the past: In series like “Masters of the Sky” or films like “Battle of Britain” you can admire course determination and command structures in the Second World War. Courses are set with a few navigation points, altitude and wind direction are determined and then they get to work with the slide rule so that the squadron knew at what time they had to take which course.
To correct this, conspicuous landmarks were flown to. Miniature airplanes – your own and those of your opponent – were then pushed back and forth on a huge table. In today’s or tomorrow’s fully integrated electronic battlefield, things look completely different. So: A drone detects a worthwhile enemy target and transmits the position, course and type of target to a comprehensive system. This decides that the enemy should be eliminated with a cruise missile launched from a destroyer. Target data and an optimal course with a terrain profile are now transmitted to the missile. The data can be optimized while still in flight. The whole thing happens practically in real time. As effective as an integrated system is, it also has a disadvantage: the individual components only achieve their effectiveness in interaction with the other modules.
Huge amounts of data accompany the use of the Taurus
The Taurus is not a weapon of the future, but it is relatively new. It cannot be used without being embedded in underlying electronics. It’s not like an officer reads some data from an Excel spreadsheet, types it into a PC and then puts it into the weapon using a data stick. It is much more complex. The Taurus can fly extremely low, making it almost impossible for ground-based defenses to lock on if the course bypasses the defenders’ positions. For flight altitudes of 50 meters and below, the terrain data must be extremely accurate. Every taller tree and every power pole needs to be taken into account. To do this, the current and changing positions of the Russian air defense must be taken into account in the planning. From this amount of reconnaissance and geodata, an exact three-dimensional terrain profile of the route and target area is created for each operation. This 3D model is the world in which the Taurus moves. And this is where the Chancellor’s problems begin. A realistic deployment of the Taurus would look like this: The exact course is transmitted to the missile from a portable terminal – in Ukraine by a Ukrainian. The 3D model required for this is created by Germans in a command structure in Germany.
Electronic warfare inner sanctum
Even if it were possible to move this Taurus command structure to Ukraine – where it can be eliminated by Russians – nothing would be gained. From there it would have to have access to the data that the Bundeswehr also has in the alliance. This could, in principle, be done by Ukrainians, but no country will give third-country officers such deep insights into the inner sanctum of modern warfare. Especially since there is a risk that these officers might end up in Russian captivity. And the basic problem would only be relocated: the system in Ukraine would have to continue to be fed with data from Germany.
South Korea owns “Taurus-Komplett”
By the way, an objection to the Scholz decision is simply absurd. People often ask scornfully where the German soldiers are located in Seoul, since South Korea also has the Taurus system. The simple answer: South Korea did not purchase individual missiles second-hand. They purchased, built and integrated not only the missile but also the electronic structure into their armed forces. But there is no such “Taurus stand alone structure in Kiev”.
Storm Shadow – Deployed by the British
In the case of the British, it is assumed that they have their own people do the programming for the Storm Shadow and that the Ukrainians basically just press the trigger. Whether the “own people” are active soldiers, or men who are officially on “sabbatical” or who have recently left the armed forces and are now helping out as “pensioners”.
Likewise, the USA and Great Britain provide exact target and course data. This is stated more or less openly. The USA and Great Britain are taking this path, even if they regulate how and when they will help Ukraine and where they will not. However, both countries operate in a different legal framework than Germany and have a tradition in which covert and sometimes rather dubious military operations are at least not uncommon.
Taurus – the last word would lie with the Constitutional Court
Scholz doesn’t want to cross this threshold. The Chancellor literally said: “German soldiers must not be linked anywhere or anywhere with the goals that this system achieves.” When asked, he added: “Not even in Germany.” The Chancellor is probably not allowed to cross this threshold. Such participation runs the risk of being stopped by the Constitutional Court. That would be a political disaster for Ukraine aid.