South Caucasus and Central Asia: Russia is losing power potential

Russia still claims its neighborhood as a zone of influence. Are the conflicts flaring up there a sign of weakness? What is certain is that Russia can act less flexibly and assert its claim to power.

When Russia’s President Vladimir Putin arrived at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, only Uzbekistan’s Prime Minister Abdulla Oripov greeted him as the host at the airport. China’s President Xi Jinping, on the other hand, was personally welcomed by the head of state, Shawkat Mirziyoyev.

At the meetings on the sidelines of the summit in Samarkand, it was Putin who had to wait for several of his interlocutors and was filmed. He, who likes to let others hold out for an hour or longer and thus sets signs of power politics. In another video clip, Putin can be seen on the arm of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. For a moment he looks tired and powerless.

Do these scenes speak for Russia’s loss of reputation and weakness – especially among the despots from Turkey to China? Are the massive casualties of Russian forces in Ukraine affecting Russia’s ability to engage in power politics in its neighborhood, namely in the South Caucasus and Central Asia?

Conflicts had flared up there again in the past week: in the South Caucasus the smoldering war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Central Asia the decades-long border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In both cases, the opponents have since agreed to ceasefires. But the agreements will hardly prevent violence from breaking out again in a few months and costing even more victims than before.

Conflicts as a means of exerting influence

In the past 30 years, the Russian leadership did not primarily treat conflicts and instability in its neighborhood as dangers to be averted, but used them as a means of exerting influence. There is a whole chain of unresolved conflicts from West to East in which Russia is involved.

However, the conflicts that have now flared up again in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia also show that the developments there are based on very specific dynamics: caused by the living conditions in the conflict regions and by the power interests of the respective state leaders.

But Russia does not currently have the flexibility to act militarily or threaten to intervene, as it has in recent years. Military expert Gustav Gressel says 60 percent of Russia’s land forces are tied up in Ukraine. “The remaining 40 percent, however, are skeleton units for training conscripts. You can’t send them into a war for nothing, especially not outside the borders of the Russian Federation.” In addition, almost all troops from abroad – for example from Syria – have been recalled.

Armenia feels left alone

The situation is different for ally Armenia, however, explains Richard Giragosian, director of the Center for Regional Studies in Yerevan: “Despite the increasing failures and tactical setbacks of the Russian military in Ukraine, the Russian military position in Armenia remains largely unaffected. Neither the 2,000 soldiers Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh nor the 7,000-strong Russian military base in Gyumri play a direct role in hostilities in Ukrainian territory.” According to Giragosian, this situation is unlikely to change in view of Russia’s more effective mobilization options and the transfer of better-equipped units from other theaters of operations.

However, the presence of Russian troops does not prevent the situation there from escalating again and again every few months. The war, which was supposed to end at the end of 2020 with a peace agreement mediated by Russia, continues.

The Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh report that the Azerbaijani armed forces have violated the ceasefire, but largely allow them to do so. The Russian troops on Armenian territory are also doing little to prevent the repeated invasions by Azerbaijani armed forces.

As a result, Azerbaijan has succeeded time and again in taking land, expelling Armenians and putting massive pressure on its leadership. Many Armenians fear for their country’s existence and feel abandoned by Russia and the CSTO and ODKB military alliance. Over the weekend, hundreds demonstrated in Yerevan for Armenia’s withdrawal from the organization.

Russia focuses on Azerbaijan

It is becoming clear that Russia pays little attention to the long-term effects of a lack of solidarity and loyalty to the alliance and is primarily pushing through its own interests: In the South Caucasus, it is about influencing Azerbaijan, which bypasses Russia and offers transport routes between Asia and Europe and has coveted gas and oil at its disposal.

In Nagorno-Karabakh, the Russian leadership secured a military presence on Azerbaijani territory for the first time in years, while keeping rival Turkey out of the way. At the same time, Putin is accommodating Azerbaijan, which has been assured of transport routes through Armenian territory in the peace agreement, which are now to be implemented soon.

However, the fact that Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev is rhetorically and militarily testing how far he can go beyond this repeatedly challenges Russia to at least use its political and economic leverage. It is becoming visibly more difficult to stop Azerbaijan. Ultimately, it only succeeds because Turkey and Iran, as regional powers, have no interest in a massive escalation into which they would inevitably be drawn. In addition, the EU keeps bringing both parties to the conflict to the table and at least cools the situation down a bit.

In two years at the latest, it will become clear how far Russia wants and can go to assert its interests: that is when the agreement on the presence of Russian peacekeeping troops in Nagorno-Karabakh will expire. Azerbaijan, armed with modern weapons from Turkey and Israel, clearly has no interest in an extension.

Advanced Security Zone

In the second conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which recently flared up again, Russia is not militarily involved. The recurring escalations are largely due to local factors. Both countries are more than ever affected by social and economic problems. The conflict over the course of the border and the exclaves is sparked off by disputes over access to water and land.

Regional experts such as Asel Doolotkeldieva point out that the heads of state in both countries are busy preserving and strengthening their own power. Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon wants to secure the transfer of power to his son. Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov made a populist election campaign with the border conflict. There is no mechanism in the region to contain the conflict with the help of international actors – such as the EU and KFOR in Kosovo.

Soldiers withdrawn from the border with Afghanistan

The leadership in Moscow sees an advanced security zone in Central Asia – also with regard to Afghanistan to the south of Tajikistan. In order to be armed against a strengthening of Islamist forces after the withdrawal of the western allies, Russia strengthened its troops in Tajikistan and carried out more military exercises.

Now Radio Free Europe reports, citing local sources, that Russia has moved more than 2,000 troops from Tajikistan to Ukraine. Several hundred soldiers are also said to have been withdrawn from Kyrgyzstan. This not only weakens Russia’s ability to act militarily in relation to Afghanistan: it is also doubtful whether operations such as the CSTO mission during the unrest in Kazakhstan at the beginning of the year would be affordable for the Russian armed forces at the moment.

This means a weakening for Russia, which also enforces political goals with its military threat potential. The inferiority of Russian military equipment in Ukraine may also result in Russia losing out as an arms supplier to competitors like Turkey.