Security: National security strategy with gaps

The negotiations took a long time, but now Germany has a comprehensive security strategy for the first time. It is intended to pool forces against internal and external threats. In many places, however, it remains vague.

With the first National Security Strategy, the Federal Government wants to better arm Germany against growing threats from within and without. After 15 months of deliberations, the cabinet decided on the more than 70-page concept, in which for the first time all security-related topics from the equipment of the Bundeswehr to the fight against climate change and civil protection are linked.

The goal is clear, writes Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) in the foreword: “To protect the security of the citizens and to make our contribution to the security of Europe.”

However, many questions remain unanswered, for example how to deal with China or the security of Ukraine after the end of the Russian war of aggression. A new institution for coordination in the event of a crisis will not be set up either. Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock (Greens) do not believe that a new National Security Council based on the US model is necessary.

The idea: “The whole range of our security”

Practically all federal ministries are concerned with the issue of security – some more, others less. So far, however, there has not been an overall strategy for everyone. The Ministry of Defense has repeatedly drawn up white papers on security policy – most recently in 2016. But they were about external security, above all national and alliance defense. Now there is one document for everything.

It’s “about the whole range of our security,” emphasized Scholz. In order to guarantee this, you not only need the military, but diplomacy as well as the police and fire brigade, technical aid organizations, development cooperation, cyber security and the protection of supply chains. “All of these resources and instruments must mesh and work together to strengthen our country’s security,” said the Chancellor.

Well-known confessions: U-turn came with the turn of the era

But what does that mean specifically? In terms of defense policy, the Federal Government has already turned around with the Chancellor’s speech on the turning point after the Russian attack on Ukraine. The existing commitments are reaffirmed in the strategy, such as the goal of investing two percent of gross domestic product in defense in the future.

Today’s Russia is classified “for the foreseeable future” as the “greatest threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region” – no surprise either. And the fact that Germany must position itself more broadly internationally in order to reduce its economic dependency on China in particular has long been practiced by Scholz and Baerbock. They travel the world to find new partners and strengthen existing partnerships.

The gaps: Much remains vague

In many places, the security strategy remains vague – for various reasons.

– Ukraine: Support as long as it is necessary – that is the top priority of German Ukraine policy. How to ensure the security of the country attacked by Russia after the end of the war is left open. Talks are currently underway in NATO with a view to the summit in Lithuania in July.

– China: A separate strategy is being developed for this, but this will only be presented after the German-Chinese government consultations in Berlin next week. This should then also include sensitive topics such as the Taiwan question or Chinese participation in German infrastructure. Scholz left open whether the China paper will be ready before the parliamentary summer break that begins in early July.

– Arms exports: For more than a year, a law has been drafted that was originally intended to more strictly control arms deliveries to countries outside the EU and NATO. That was before the turning point. The strategy leaves open the extent to which easing is now necessary in order to strengthen partnerships beyond NATO. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD) made a clear statement: “In view of the new world situation, arms exports are of course also part of the strategic toolkit.”

The Institutions: No National Security Council

Deliberations on the security strategy began in March 2022 – shortly after the Russian attack on Ukraine. The fact that it took so long is also due to the fact that Scholz and Baerbock could not agree on whether a central control center for the coordination of all security issues was necessary. The Foreign Office feared that it would lose influence with a National Security Council demanded by the FDP and the Union if the Chancellery took over its leadership – a question of power.

In the end, the decision was made to leave everything as it is. “A greater added value was not recognized,” said Scholz. The Federal Security Council and the Security Cabinet with the Chancellor and several ministers continue to be responsible for security issues. When asked whether he had to swallow a toad, the head of the FDP and Federal Minister of Finance, Christian Lindner, said that “there are always alternative options for action. But within a government, you then form a common understanding, also with regard to the method of cooperation. And that’s here happens.”

The critics: countries feel overwhelmed

The countries that are responsible for the state police, for example, are also part of a national security strategy. They complain that they were not sufficiently involved. “If the federal government had a serious interest in developing a future-oriented security strategy, it should have involved the federal states in a suitable form via the technical working groups of the conference of interior ministers,” said Hesse’s Interior Minister Peter Beuth (CDU), spokesman for the Union-led interior ministries the cabinet decision.

Opposition leader Friedrich Merz also criticized the lack of state participation and otherwise does not leave a good hair on the strategy: “What we have here now as a national security strategy is bloodless in content, strategically irrelevant, operationally without consequences and foreign policy uncoordinated,” complained the CDU/CSU parliamentary group leader in the Bundestag, who is also the CDU chairman.

The side effect: signal of unity in difficult coalition times

Despite all the gaps, the traffic light coalition partners were satisfied with the result. When presenting the strategy in the hall of the federal press conference, the association of journalists in the capital, Scholz was supported by four ministers. There is rarely such a large cabinet contingent there. Lindner was there for the FDP, who does not have a classic security department, but has the money to finance security.

The five did not reveal any real differences. In the past few weeks there has already been enough arguments in the traffic light, most recently especially about the heating law. On Wednesday, the traffic light delegation seemed pretty relaxed on the podium. At one point, Scholz even said with a smile: “We also want to shape the next legislative period together. (…) Just so that there are no misunderstandings.”

dpa

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