Even though China became significantly more restrictive under President Xi Jinping and one civil rights activist after another was imprisoned: the communist party leader was popular with the people. He enjoyed great support above all for his fight against corruption, but also for his claim to develop China into the dominant world power. But what’s the point of that now that people across the country have been protesting against the zero-Covid strategy on the streets? Against a policy inseparable from Xi Jinping?
For the first time since 1989, people across more than a dozen cities and across all classes took to the streets this week for a common cause. China’s leadership responded by stationing police units at sensitive locations in Beijing, Guangzhou and other megacities. Urumqi Street in Shanghai, where demonstrators demanded the resignation of party leader Xi, is blocked with barricades. All traces of the “Din-A4-Revolution”, the symbol of which is a white sheet of paper, are being erased from the Internet.
Xi made his zero-Covid strategy a question of loyalty
The government is acting as a deterrent, but the enforced calm cannot hide the great displeasure of the people. For three years, Xi presented himself as the architect of the zero-Covid strategy. Because the strict measures initially effectively prevented infections, China’s leadership presented them as proof that their socialist system was superior to the democracies. Xi repeatedly called for the measures to be adhered to, even when there was an alternative to isolation with vaccines. The President made his zero-Covid strategy a question of loyalty.
It is now clear that the centralization of virus control that has characterized Xi’s authoritarian leadership since 2012 was a serious political mistake. It prevented local authorities and health authorities from being able to adopt flexible measures. For political reasons, Beijing also did not allow mRNA or vector vaccines from abroad, although these are considered more effective than Chinese vaccines.
The government preferred to rely on mass tests and forced quarantine. Even Chinese experts have been warning for years that the vaccination rate among the elderly is too low. The unprotected seniors are the reason why Beijing can now decide to relax the quarantine rules, but not immediately.
Even if a change of course would have to be communicated carefully, it cannot be ruled out. Chinese party leaders have proven again and again that they are capable of great pragmatism in crises. But Xi Jinping is now under enormous personal pressure, for the first time he can’t blame anyone else. And there have long been signs that his support in the party is not unlimited. At the party congress, the body did not incorporate key political concepts from Xi into the party constitution. Like the magazine Nike Asia remarked, he has not been referred to as a “people’s leader” for some time. At the National People’s Congress next March, the party leader could be forced to make further concessions.
The dissatisfaction of the Chinese goes much deeper
Beijing knows the dissatisfaction of many Chinese goes far beyond the Covid strategy. The CP bases its claim to power on the expectations, fueled for decades, that China will become ever richer and that the standard of living of all Chinese will rise. But this lucky formula seems to have been exhausted.
The country is struggling with problems that are familiar from other, more developed economies: Salaries are stagnating, especially in the lower salary brackets. Inequality is increasing, social mobility is decreasing. Much of the 800 million workforce is underskilled. At the same time, the population is aging faster than expected. In order to solve the underlying social and economic dilemmas, Xi would have to initiate fundamental reforms. The opposite is the case. He swears by an economy with strong state control and leaves important reforms untouched.
It remains to be seen how far the protests will turn against the political system. The security apparatus should avert an immediate danger to the party. But in addition to Xi’s popularity, confidence in the central instruments of communist governance has also been shaken.
In the “popular struggle” against the virus, the party relied on an army of corona guards – simple security guards, party representatives and volunteers from the neighborhood committees, who also served as the most important instrument of social control before the pandemic. But the longer the measures lasted, the more violent the helpers in the white protective suits had to use. The collective excesses are reminiscent of the dark chapters under Mao, who used brute force to mobilize the masses for his political goals. Exhausted and overwhelmed, China’s “white guards” have become a symbol of state failure.