Actually, the result has long been known when the delegates from all over China meet in Beijing on Sunday to determine the new leadership of the Communist Party (CP). Should state and party leader Xi Jinping not get his third term in office, that would be more than a surprise. Nevertheless, observers are looking forward to the spectacle that will take place in the Great Hall of the People. They hope for a glimpse behind the scenes of the opaque power apparatus and information on the political priorities of the coming years in the world’s second largest economy. The most important questions and answers:
What happens at the party conference?
The party congress is theoretically the most important decision-making body of the CP, de facto the coronation mass of the party’s new leadership. It meets every five years. And since in China the party, and not the government, makes all political decisions, here are the new leaders of the state.
Outwardly, everything is strictly democratic: around 2,300 delegates represent more than 90 million party members. They should represent all regions, ethnic groups and party hierarchies. Here they determine the approximately 200 members and 170 substitute candidates of the Central Committee. They also discuss party politics in recent years and vote on changes to the party constitution. After the end of the party congress, which lasts about a week, the new Central Committee will in turn appoint the 25 members of the Politburo, the (currently seven) members of the Politburo’s Standing Committee and the party leader, i.e. the central rulers in the country.
From a real choice can after Expert assessment However, this is out of the question: the delegates and candidates were pre-selected by Xi and his staff, and the new posts behind the scenes have already been agreed. The delegates will only nod and give the whole thing an official framework.
What’s at stake?
Foreign Governments and Financial Markets want to gauge how much support Xi has within the party. There are many reasons for dissatisfaction: the country is struggling with an economic crisis that has been made worse by the strict zero-Covid policy. Externally, Xi’s aggressive wolf-warrior diplomacy and backing for Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has made him unpopular. At the same time, on the way to his third term, Xi has broken many taboos that the party put in place after the death of state founder Mao Zedong to prevent escapades such as the Great Leap or the Cultural Revolution that brought great suffering to the country.
Against this background, should Xi primarily hoist loyal comrades into top positions, this would bode badly for the western world, as it shows that Xi can do as he pleases. However, should many technocrats rise according to the conventions, this would be a positive sign, since Xi’s power would then – apparently at least – be limited. What is certain, however, is that number two in the hierarchy, Li Keqiang, who is considered business-friendly, will take a back seat.
A more symbolic sign of Xi’s power will be whether he is given new titles such as “chairman”, “helmsman” or “leader of the people” that put him on a par with state founder Mao.
What are the rules for the distribution of posts?
Established Rules there is hardly any, rather customs that have crystallized over the past few decades. Xi’s predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, resigned after two terms as general secretary. It doesn’t look like that for Xi: He has not established a clear successor in recent years and has lifted the time limit for the office of president, which will not be formally determined until the People’s Congress next March.
There is also an age limit: As a rule, Politburo members from the age of 68 retire at the party congress. The 69-year-old Xi would tear down this limit, but that was also partly the case with his predecessors. The question is whether his Politburo allies, some of whom are older, will be allowed to remain in their posts – or even lower the bar to allow more replacements and promotions to rising cadres. Finally, party members are usually promoted incrementally. They must complete certain posts, from local government to the party leader of an important province, before they can reach the highest office. If cadres skip some of these levels, this indicates a special closeness to Xi.
Hardly matters anymore observers according to the affiliation to certain cliques such as Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai clique or Hu Jintao’s youth league faction. Xi cracks down on such patronage as part of his anti-corruption campaign. Recently, former powerful Deputy Police Minister Sun Lijun and former Justice Minister Fu Zhenghua were sentenced to death on allegations of clique formation and “disloyalty” to Xi.