Status: 09.11.2021 6:51 p.m.
A year ago the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan ended. Now the region is to be networked again via traffic routes and open borders. But the most important thing is missing.
“Three plus three” is the new formula. At the end of 2020, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan proposed an alliance: His state should form an alliance with Russia and Iran as well as the three South Caucasus states Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. The former traffic routes between Europe and Asia are to be reconnected, closed borders are to be opened. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region prevented this for a good three decades. Even now it is questionable how promising this ambitious project is.
One year has passed since the 44-day war, which cost the lives of well over 6,000 people. At a high price, Azerbaijan, with the support of Turkey, was able to recapture areas that the Armenians had claimed as a security zone around Nagorno-Karabakh.
In addition, they penetrated into that part that the Armenians claim because this is the only way to secure their right to self-determination. When the Azerbaijanis were preparing to take all of Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia enforced a ceasefire.
Cooperation or power play
President Vladimir Putin ensured that Russian troops would initially secure the areas of Nagorno-Karabakh inhabited by the Armenians for five years. Soldiers and military equipment were already on the march when Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s Head of State Ilham Aliyev signed the ceasefire agreement on November 9, 2020.
This also contains specifications for reactivating old traffic routes. One of them is supposed to reconnect Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhichevan, which in turn borders on Turkey. Erdogan’s “three plus three” plan ties in with this. However, these projects can only be implemented if the South Caucasus states and the regional powers in the neighborhood are in agreement.
The question is whether old rivalries and enmity can be overcome and trust can be built for this. Or it is ultimately about a power game from which one side wants to emerge victorious: Turkey with its fraternal and military partner Azerbaijan or Russia in association with Armenia and, in some cases, with Iran.
Hatred and fear
The 2020 ceasefire agreement does not provide for a process of reconciliation and building trust between the conflicting parties. After the war ended, hatred even grew when it became clear how many families on both sides had lost loved ones and when videos of the most serious abuse of prisoners emerged.
The lost war plunged Armenia into a deep crisis. The anger over the many dead and the lost territory discharged to Prime Minister Pashinyan. The opposition wanted a coup, but there was no popular support. In an early parliamentary election in June, Pashinyan was able to secure a majority again. But especially in the border regions with Azerbaijan, there is great fear of neighbors and distrust of the government. Smaller groups train the defense of their country, some even dream of reconquest.
Triumph and prestige
In Azerbaijan, President Aliyev made sure that there was hardly any thought of reconciliation. He never tired of uttering accusations and threats to the Armenians in triumphant speeches. In the spring he inaugurated a trophy park in Baku with captured military equipment and dolls depicting the Armenians in a derogatory way.
Aliyev was only initially able to distract from deficits with aggressiveness. Many are now talking again about corruption and its authoritarian approach. The cost of building the reclaimed territories will be immense, while oil and gas revenues are likely to decline. But Aliyev is relying on prestige projects and announcing “smart” cities. And he is pushing for the connection to Nakhichevan to be established at last.
A conflict like an undertow
A commission headed by Russia is negotiating the infrastructure projects. But the reality on site was different. Fighting broke out on several border lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in some cases heavy military equipment was used and soldiers and civilians were killed. Often it took a while for the Russian troops to calm the situation down. At the same time, Russia, Turkey and, most recently, Iran threatened to be drawn into the conflict.
In the end, the Russian leadership repeatedly calmed the situation and thus defended its position of supremacy – in case of doubt, Turkey gave in. The EU and the USA only play a marginal role. Representatives from Paris and Washington expressed themselves as members of the Minsk group, but at the moment one route only seems to lead through Moscow.
The EU is working on a program that includes funding for the construction of infrastructure. There is a small leverage here, because the regional powers as well as the South Caucasus countries suffer from economic problems.
The opening of the transport routes could give the entire region an enormous boost. But concentrating on the technical aspects without building trust between the local people has so far proven to be unsuccessful.