Silence sometimes also contains a statement. And the silence with which the EU initially acknowledged the adoption of the so-called law on the transparency of foreign influence in Georgia on Monday showed that Europe was – once again – divided. While a majority of the 27 EU countries saw the law as a direct attack on the democratic and constitutional norms and values of the European Union, which seriously endangers Georgia’s accession process, two countries reportedly opposed this disapproval to communicate exactly the same way towards Tbilisi.
According to diplomats, Hungary and Slovakia on Monday blocked a harsh statement that had already been prepared in which the entire EU unitedly warned the Georgian government of unpleasant consequences. It was only on Tuesday, when the silence in Brussels became too embarrassing, that EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell was allowed to comment. He published a statement – but only in his own name and that of the EU Commission – in which he let the government in Tbilisi know that the law had a “negative impact” on Georgia’s EU accession prospects and that they should withdraw it.
:Anger at the “Russian law”
Eight out of ten Georgians want to join the EU, and the government is also officially aiming for this goal. Nevertheless, to the horror of citizens, it passed a repressive law on Tuesday that can only enrage Brussels. What’s behind it?
The behavior of the governments in Budapest and Bratislava was not entirely surprising. The prime ministers there, Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico, are supporters of a more autocratic style of government. They also take a much more friendly approach to the EU Russia than the other member countries.
The EU can hardly revoke Georgia’s candidate status
The Georgian law, in turn, is referred to there as “Russian law”. Similar to corresponding regulations in Russia, it obliges non-governmental organizations to register as “organizations under foreign influence” if they receive more than a fifth of their funding from abroad. The law thus has the potential to control Georgian civil society, which relies on financial support from the West, in a similar way to the way the Russian law does. In this respect, it is probably not an exaggeration to say that Orbán and Fico have few problems with Georgian law. Their motivation to allow a harsh condemnation from the EU that could impress Tbilisi was therefore limited.
The statement that Borrell was allowed to publish on Tuesday broke the silence in Brussels. However, it does not solve the dilemma that the EU is in with regard to Georgia.
On the one hand, it should now be clear: the upgrading of Georgia to an official accession candidate, which was only decided by the EU in December 2023, has de facto been overtaken by reality. At the moment it is not clear how the EU can hold accession negotiations with a government that has knowingly and in a highly provocative manner violated the Union’s fundamental values. Because Tbilisi cannot plead ignorance: last week, twelve EU foreign ministers, including those of Germany, France and Poland, made it clear in a letter to Borrell that the Georgian law “is incompatible with progress on Georgia’s path towards… the EU”. Borrell also used this formulation on Tuesday.
On the other hand, people in Brussels are aware of the surveys that eight out of ten Georgian citizens want to see their country in the EU. Geopolitical reasons also speak in favor of connecting the state in the Caucasus to Europe. The EU can hardly revoke Georgia’s candidate status – that would be an undesirable punishment for those Georgians who demonstrate with EU flags against their own pro-Russian government, as well as a violation of its own security policy interests. Diplomats therefore expect the EU to wait at least until October. Then there will be elections in Georgia, after which the situation could be clearer.