Military Expert: “How Many Reserves Does Ukraine Have?”

Ukraine will break through the next defense positions, says military expert Nico Lange. But whether it can then strategically take over territory and cut through Russian supplies depends on the remaining reserves.

NDR: The counter-offensive in Ukraine is now showing signs of success, especially in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces managed to capture the village of Robotyne and continue to advance from there. How do you rate this initiative?

Nico Long: This is a very important and significant development. In the first eight weeks of the counteroffensive, Ukraine faced great difficulties because the Russian defense strategy was very effective.

But for four weeks it has been the case that the Russians, despite early counterattacks, despite mines and defensive positions, have lost the important waypoints; and that Ukraine has now breached the first line of defense and, at least in part, the second as well – above all in the direction of Werbove, i.e. east of Robotyne.

Ukraine now has more opportunities thanks to these breakthroughs. She can go further east, she can go further south. This is of course a dilemma for Russia, because it raises the question: where are you going to bring reinforcements now?

There are many indications that the second and third lines of defense are not as heavily manned and that Russia does not have the time to build and man the defenses as it did on the first line.

If you look closely at the territory in the south, you will see that out of the 120, 110 kilometers from the Ukrainian front line to the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov, about the first 20, maybe 25 kilometers are riddled with defensive positions. After that comes open terrain.

So if Ukraine manages to break through there, a war of movement could ensue. The crucial question will then be: How many reserves does Ukraine then have to make something out of these breakthroughs?

Similar procedure as in Cherson?

NDR: It has often been defined as a goal for the Ukrainian troops to advance through Melitopol to the Sea of ​​Azov and thus cut off the Russians’ land route to the Crimea. They say it’s not really necessary. Why not?

Long: Ukraine has not told anyone what the aim of this counter-offensive is. The alleged goals of recapturing Tokmak or Melitopol, Berdyansk or Mariupol come from projections by observers. I am not aware of any statements by Ukraine that that is the goal.

If you look at the situation in the south, you can see that rail logistics and road logistics are crucial for the Russians, both between mainland Russia and Crimea and for the southern corridor.

Perhaps the decisive factor now is the question: Can Ukraine advance so far south that it can at least take the lifelines of Russia’s supplies under constant precision fire, or even sever them altogether?

And can Ukraine damage the Crimean bridges further or cut them completely, because then the situation in Crimea and in the south would become precarious and Russia might be forced to give up towns or entire areas there because the troops can no longer be supplied?

That seems to me to be more promising than saying: There is an attack on Tokmak or Melitopol. We see in Bachmut how long a fight for certain towns can last and what kind of destruction it entails. Kherson retook Ukraine without storming Kherson. We may see a similar approach here.

“Ukraine will need further mobilization”

NDR: We do not know how many Ukrainian soldiers have been wounded or died. Military analyst Franz-Stefan Gady worries about the number of Ukrainian soldiers left. Do you share this concern?

Long: The concern is justified. While Ukraine keeps secret what reserves it has left, this is the deciding factor for exploiting a possible breakthrough and going deep.

It is well known that launching offensives, especially in an open country where you can see for miles – against an opponent who has strong artillery and air superiority – is extremely costly because you are forced to attack as if on display.

Ukraine is very good – much better than Russia – at saving the lives of its soldiers. But it is precisely with this offensive in these minefields that the soldiers can be rescued, but unfortunately they often lose limbs, have severe burns or similar injuries. And many are also very traumatized.

You cannot return to the battlefield. The Ukraine will therefore also need further mobilization, which has already started.

“NATO forces have learned a lot”

NDR: Do you have the impression that the NATO countries have sufficiently trained the Ukrainian soldiers for this counter-offensive? Or does what NATO is now teaching and has taught not at all fit with this war in Ukraine?

Long: The Ukrainian armed forces don’t fight like you learn at the command and control academy or like it says on the Bundeswehr pocket card. They rely a lot on their own war experience since 2014. From a tactical point of view, that’s sometimes good, sometimes you have to be critical. In particular, if you keep seeing advances from very small formations, without air support at that, against the enemy with strong artillery.

Where Ukraine will continue to need support is in operations from the brigade level upwards. With larger formations, when you have to communicate a lot and bring a lot of elements together, there seem to be difficulties. This is a problem right now when it comes to attacking on a broad front in a huge terrain.

NATO forces have learned a lot from the Ukrainians. There are many new elements in this war where the Ukrainians can teach us something and we should learn from them – but unfortunately we cannot help them.

Dealing with drones of all kinds that are always available and present in large numbers, moving around under constant drone surveillance, using drones for all sorts of purposes – we have absolutely no experience with that, especially not in combat. We don’t even have these drones in our equipment.

What will be decided in the coming weeks

NDR: The US military expert Michael Kofman writes that a lot could be decided in the next few weeks. What do you think can be decided?

Long: Ukraine will break through the already mentioned defense positions – it is very likely. The crucial first question is: how many reserves does Ukraine then still have in order to then make something out of these breakthroughs in a war of movement, to advance in depth and strategically bring territory under its control again?

A big problem would arise if Ukraine ran out of reserves in the open country. Then the armed forces of Ukraine would be in a very uncomfortable position. So they must be able to advance to key points once they break through the defenses. Whether this will succeed will be decided in the coming weeks and months.

What will also be decided is the second question: To what extent will Russian logistics, which is very dependent on the railways but also, for example, on private transport companies with articulated lorries, be limited? And what does that mean for the staying power of the Russian troops in the south and also in Crimea?

The Ukrainian advances could leave the Russians in a logistically untenable position. This would strengthen Ukraine’s general military position and political negotiating position, especially when Crimea is involved.

The third decision, which will be of great importance in the coming weeks and months, is whether Russia will be able to launch relief attacks or launch new attacks elsewhere in Ukraine, possibly in the north near Kupyansk. Such attacks have been claimed in propaganda for some time, but have not yet been proven. That could get Ukraine’s resource management between the south and east in trouble.

These three parameters are decisive for the course of the war in the coming weeks and months.

The interview was conducted by Anna Engelke, NDR. It has been edited for the written version.