Gas company: nationalization – including security risk?

Has the federal government brought in Russian spies by nationalizing the former Gazprom Germania? According to research by WDR there should have been corresponding information about several employees in the past year.

Only a few weeks after Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine began, Robert Habeck appeared in front of the cameras at a hastily called press conference in Berlin. The Federal Minister of Economics appreciates free speech. But now he put on his glasses, looked very serious and read from the sheet. “I would like to inform you today about a legal order,” said the Green politician at the beginning of April last year. The state will place Gazprom Germania, the German subsidiary of Russia’s gas giants, under the trusteeship of the Federal Network Agency.

In view of the looming energy crisis and new sanctions by the Kremlin regime against corporations in Europe, the step is “absolutely necessary,” explained Habeck. The company operates critical infrastructure in Germany and is “of paramount importance for the gas supply in Germany.” Gazprom Germania was nationalized in November last year. Costs for taxpayers: a double-digit billion amount.

The state takeover initially had no effect on the employees, and the existing employment contracts for the around 1,500 employees continued to apply. When asked about safety checks on the employees of this company, which is central to the German energy supply, the company explains: General safety checks on employees did not take place because they are not permitted under labor law.

Connection to Russian secret services?

And so the federal government apparently also took on employees who are seen as a potential risk in German security authorities. According to research by WDR several employees of the nationalized successor company were suspected of being in contact with Russian secret services last year. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) is said to have taken a closer look at the relevant people – also because the employees apparently had access to documents on the German energy supply that were classified as confidential.

In particular, one person who is said to have been responsible for security and data protection in the company, among other things, is said to be suspected of having excellent contacts with the Kremlin, according to the findings of German security authorities.

A spokeswoman for the company, which was renamed “Sefe – Securing Energy for Europe” after nationalization, said on request that there had never been any official information on possible secret service activities relating to the person named above. When asked specifically about the person, the company explains: “Sefe followed up on unofficial tips and took appropriate measures to protect sensitive information. Sefe is in close contact with the responsible security authorities regarding unofficial tips also not confirmed by the authorities.”

They are aware of the importance of counter-espionage for the company – and thus for the energy supply of Germany and Europe – and have taken measures in this area since the trust was set up. For example, the offices of the management have been made tap-proof.

gas as a weapon

The general public probably only became aware of the key role played by the former German subsidiary of the Gazprom group in Germany’s energy supply after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. On February 24, 2022, in the middle of winter, Vladimir Putin ordered an attack on Ukraine. It quickly became clear that the Russian dictator would also use gas as a weapon.

Germany was threatened with the greatest possible energy crisis. Luckily, one might think, Germany had the largest gas storage facility in Europe in Rehden. Almost four billion cubic meters of natural gas can be stored here in cavities two kilometers below the earth’s surface. Germany’s emergency reserve for times of crisis. But the levels were at one percent. The emergency reserve was empty.

It was probably no coincidence that the gas storage tanks were emptied just before the start of the war. Through its subsidiary Astoria, Gazprom Germania was the owner of the gas storage facility. The then Federal Minister of Economics, Sigmar Gabriel, made a corresponding deal with the BASF subsidiary Wintershall a top priority in 2015 and waved it through. A year after the Russian annexation of Crimea, Gazprom Germania took over the coveted gas storage facility in Lower Saxony, in return for which Wintershall acquired a stake in a Siberian gas field.

Through another subsidiary, Wingas, the company was also a major player in gas trading and also supplied numerous municipal utilities, regional suppliers and industrial companies with Russian gas. Gazprom has bought its way deep into the German energy market with its German subsidiary. Founded shortly after reunification, Gazprom Germania blossomed into an international group of companies, active in 16 countries, with 50 companies and currently 1,500 employees. A few weeks after the start of the war, the energy company caused great concern for the government.

Finally, the federal government nationalized the key company. The greatest possible energy crisis could be averted with this step, among other things. Germany’s living rooms stayed warm in winter, companies continued to produce. However, it is questionable whether the federal government was fully aware of the risks associated with the takeover of Gazprom Germania.

Apparently the first warnings last year

In the past year, the company’s environment is said to have given the first warnings to German security authorities. The suspicion is said to have been expressed that some employees probably have close ties to Russian secret services.

It wouldn’t be the first time that employees of the company were associated with secret services: In 2008, the then head of finance and the head of human resources made headlines because both had previously worked for the Ministry for State Security (MfS) of the GDR.

The Federal Network Agency, which was initially responsible for the fiduciary management of Gazprom Germania last year, said on request that it was at least not aware of any “concrete indications” of possible intelligence links. Nevertheless, “immediately after the start of the trust administration, a general representative was appointed who took over all central business functions with an external team of consultants,” according to a spokesman for the authority. “Critical information and important decisions were no longer the responsibility of the company’s previous representatives.”