analysis
From rebellion to retreat in 24 hours – the uprising of the Wagner troops highlights the weaknesses of the system of government of Russian President Putin. What follows from this day – for Putin, the Wagner troupe and the war?
Putin’s private army model has failed
The uprising of the Wagner troupe had Frankenstein-like features – it was the uprising of a self-created monster. Vladimir Putin encouraged the emergence of private armies in Russia for many years, and the Wagner force was the largest and most well-known of them.
For Putin, this has long been an advantageous construct. A highly trained mercenary force is used in international conflicts and civil wars such as in Libya or Mali and other countries, thus strengthening Russia’s influence and strategic opportunities. At the same time, Russia could deny being a party to these conflicts.
A lucrative business area was created for the Wagner troops, which gave them access to raw materials such as gold in the conflict areas. The war against Ukraine turned the Wagner troops into a domestic political factor in Russia. Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin recruited fighters in prison camps and supplied additional forces to the task forces in Ukraine.
His own fighters often proved more motivated in Ukraine, and Prigozhin let the public know as much. Whether the information is always correct is another matter, the Russian army leadership has repeatedly doubted it publicly.
By then, however, Prigozhin could hardly be controlled, and the conflict with the army leadership around Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valeri Gerrasimov over equipment and support had been escalating since the autumn – to the point of alleged attacks by the army on Wagner soldiers and finally the uprising of Saturday.
The formation and use of the private armies is based on trust in their loyalty and subordination to an existing system. Yesterday, Saturday at the latest, made it clear how much such military groups can become independent and then endanger the system that they created.
The weakness of the army and reconnaissance services
According to their own statements, the Wagner fighters were able to get within 200 kilometers of Moscow in less than 24 hours. They did not encounter any significant resistance. Whether a further march could have been carried out at a similar pace remains to be seen. However, the insurgents were able to take control of important military bases such as Rostov without any major problems.
One reason for this might be that the Russian army has relocated a significant proportion of its soldiers to Ukraine or the border region. The rapid advance of the rebels now shows how the interior defenses are doing.
But the uprising also represents a defeat for the reconnaissance services. Apparently they didn’t see the revolt of the Wagner fighters coming. According to media reports, however, the US secret services learned of the corresponding preparations a few days ago and informed members of Congress. The Russian armed forces, on the other hand, were apparently unprepared for the rebellion.
Prigozhin as an alternative?
When parts of the army staged a coup against the then President of the Soviet Union, Michael Gorbachev, in 1992, the population opposed the insurgents. Nothing is known of this from Rostov and Voronezh. Instead, videos circulating on Twitter are said to show people welcoming the Wagner mercenaries and expressing their support for them.
Even if these were videos that could not initially be checked and may have been isolated cases, there could be an indication here that Prigozchin and the Wagner troupe have become an alternative for those who are dissatisfied in Russia. One factor may have been that Prigozhin repeatedly showed himself at the front – unlike the army leadership, which rarely exposed itself to the war.
Successful, brutal fighters – and ultra-nationalists: This combination apparently appeals to many people in Russia now, as it corresponds in the broadest sense to the messages that Putin has been spreading for years. Opposition is persecuted in Russia, but nationalism is welcome – this opens up space for actors like Prigozhin, as long as they stick to the rules of the game. The uprising of the Wagner troupe shows the risk inherent in this model – and its limitations.
Putin is no longer untouchable
For months, Putin publicly watched Prigozhin’s increasingly loudly formulated claims and his increasingly crude attacks on the army leadership without comment. On the day of the revolt, he did not mention Prigozhin and the Wagner group by name in his TV speech. His announcement that those involved in the “stab in the back” would be pursued went unheeded: as planned beforehand, they should now simply be integrated into the Russian army if they so choose.
In this conflict, Putin presented a hesitant and indecisive image that stands in stark contrast to the image of the determined leader he paints and allows to be painted.
His power rested not least on his promise of stability: a state that functioned in any way, that more or less reliably guaranteed its citizens at least a low standard of living, in return for which the citizens let the leadership do what they wanted – this model has now cracked.
Worse still, Putin relied primarily on the official and unofficial security services and has so far been the balancing factor between their competing interests. This model also no longer works to the extent it used to, as the rebellion of the Wagner people shows, even if, according to them, it was initially not directed against Putin but against the army leadership. But since June 24, Putin has not kept the rivalry between the services in check.
What does this mean for Putin?
What this means for Putin’s rule in the medium and long term cannot yet be foreseen. According to the unanimous assessment of observers, the Russian President wanted to be re-elected in the coming year, so he had a constitutional amendment approved in a referendum in 2020.
It is unclear whether this plan will last. The effects of last Saturday on the internal power structure may only become apparent in the coming weeks. The silence of leading representatives of the Putin system, such as Defense Minister Shoigu, Chief of Staff Gerasimov and the head of the National Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, was striking.
One of the exciting questions in the coming weeks will be which dynamics will be triggered by Putin’s openly revealed weakness. Certainly, no representative of the elite supported Prigozhin on Saturday, be it out of conviction or calculation.
And yet, with the uprising against Putin, the possibility of the end of his rule is visibly in the air for every citizen. The idea that there could be another president than Putin has gotten into people’s minds, says Russia expert Leslie Schübel tagesschau24 – this will now certainly be discussed at the dinner tables in Russia.
What will become of Prigozhin and Wagner?
That too is anything but clear on the day after the uprising – what further details the agreement that Alexandr Lukashenko negotiated contains is not known for the time being.
So one can guess: What will Prigozhin do in Minsk? What will become of the other companies in his group, and above all of his mercenaries’ foreign assignments? Are these also subordinated to the Ministry of Defense and thus an official use by Russia? Who will finance them in the future? After being so exposed by the uprising, what space is left for Putin to Prigozhin and Wagner?
And vice versa, there is also the question of what will become of Shoigu and Gerasimov. Can they still remain in office after the recent events? Does the agreement negotiated by Lukashenko also contain an agreement on this? All of this is unclear so far, but the question is on the table.
And what does all this mean for the war?
Prigozhin has been able to appear more and more openly and demanding as a military leader in recent weeks because the clout of his mercenaries apparently plays a significant role in the war against Ukraine.
It is uncertain how many of these mercenaries will sign an agreement with the Russian army. Whether they can refuse to sign at all, likewise.
The tangible rivalry between the two units has been evident in recent weeks. Whether this can be eliminated with an incorporation is a question mark.
It remains to be seen whether this will affect the army’s clout in the war against Ukraine – and what use the Ukrainian army can derive from it in its offensive. On the day of the coup, the army continued its attacks on the neighboring country unabated.