exclusive
For years, German institutions have provided development aid in the Gaza Strip. MR-Research shows that materials and know-how could have fallen into the wrong hands.
Material, expertise and logistics were used in the construction of rockets and tunnels by the terrorist organization Hamas, just as they were used for German development aid projects. Pipes, sewer rings, steel and cement can be used for both civil and terrorist purposes (“dual use”). The providers of German development aid point to strict controls. There is no evidence of abuse.
The Hessian radio interviewed development aid organizations and evaluated project reports. After months, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMZ) achieved the release of 150 pages of files through the Freedom of Information Act. The data has been discussed with a dozen civil and rocket engineers.
Water pipes to rockets
“If you don’t want it to be a high-quality rocket, any reasonably strong steel tube will work,” says Johann Höcherl, a weapons technician at the University of the Bundeswehr in Munich. Robert Schmucker, retired professor from the Technical University, also lives in Munich. Schmucker was a weapons inspector for the United Nations and an advisor to the Bundeswehr and NATO. In Israel he examined Hamas rockets. It is clear: Hamas fighters would build rockets based on water pipes.
The state-run “Gesellschaft for International Cooperation” (GIZ) was active in hydraulic engineering in the Gaza Strip until the end of 2018. In internal documents, the GIZ office in the Palestinian territories reports on technical improvements and capacity building of the water systems. A new deployment has been considered since 2022, but was canceled due to the war.
GIZ attaches great importance to the statement that it has never financed or delivered water pipes. “During the project implementation, progress checks were carried out continuously on site to ensure the correct use of funds,” says a press spokesman.
Tunnel construction with civil technology
In a concept from 2016, GIZ writes about “equipment for operation and maintenance” including wastewater systems. This includes a well-developed canal system in the Gaza Strip. The German state bank KfW has also been financing construction projects in the Gaza Strip with amounts in the high double-digit millions for more than twenty years. A few large projects were paid for, as well as forty small construction sites in the water and wastewater sector.
“You don’t just build a tunnel like that,” says Jan Lüking, who teaches geotechnics at the Lübeck University of Technology. Lüking analyzed Hamas video footage of its tunnel system, which Israel captured. “Formwork elements from canal construction are also used,” says Lüking. An exit shown is clearly a sewer shaft. Ceiling parts looked like structural elements from building construction: “Perhaps they were misused.”
At the end of last year, the chairman of the GIZ management, Thorsten Schäfer-Gümbel, appeared at the press club in Frankfurt am Main. When asked about sewage construction in Gaza and possible misappropriation for terrorist tunnels, the former SPD politician remained silent.
When asked, GIZ and KfW point to particularly strict internal and external controls and audits, sometimes in close coordination with Israeli authorities. “GIZ staff on site continuously checked that the material was used and installed correctly,” says GIZ. KfW also explains: “We have no information that material could have been diverted.”
“Dual use” controls
After Palestinian uprisings (“Second Intifada”) and terrorist attacks, Israel began cutting off the Gaza Strip from “dual-use” goods two decades ago. Steel and cement should only be imported into civil buildings under strict controls.
Internal reports document information deficiencies: KfW writes about “small-scale direct commissioning of material deliveries” by “inexperienced implementation partners”. In 2014, GIZ noted that information on wastewater projects was only available to a limited extent. “The local systems for monitoring and evaluation must first be further developed,” said GIZ in 2015.
In statements today, the BMZ and GIZ say there were never any indications of misappropriation or lost material. Partner organizations and their employees, financial channels and material deliveries were checked several times. In a recent review, “the control mechanisms have proven to be robust,” the BMZ said.
The KfW also refers to systematic and random checks and clear planning: “During the construction work, there were no reference points to possible tunnels beneath the locations.”
Procurement of personnel complicated
A problem for controls is a lack of access to the Gaza Strip. Since the Hamas coup in 2007, work by foreign experts has only been possible to a limited extent. Official German development aid relies on local employees and visits from the West Bank and Germany.
“The GIZ employees responsible for the projects were on business trips to Gaza at least twice a month – sometimes for several days at a time,” says the GIZ spokesman, “In this way, the GIZ checked that the implementation was correct.” The BMZ explains: “In the Gaza Strip, international consulting firms or the United Nations monitor the transport, storage and installation of every single component.”
KfW, on the other hand, reports internally via “local experts”. Upon request, there is talk of “external, independent experts” who checked the construction sites on a daily basis. In addition, there were random checks by experts, “especially when KfW employees were unable to travel to the site themselves.”
Some partner organizations “actively tried to involve ‘violent’ residents in project activities,” according to a KfW report. The potential for conflict should be reduced by “providing jobs for former refugees and young people.” When asked, KfW stated that it had “no knowledge whatsoever” about the use of violent people.
What tunnel builders need to know
Geotechnical engineering professors disagree about the level of theory needed to build Hamas tunnels. Kerstin Lesny from the University of Siegen expects experienced engineers with master’s degrees. A lot of things could be tried out through trial and error, says Christoph Budach from the TU Cologne and says: “Higher technical understanding obviously helps.”
“None of this is highly accurate,” says Hauke Zachert from TU Darmstadt, “but you do need people who have knowledge.” A senior tunneling engineer cannot be quoted by name because his employer did not authorize the interview. He is sure that additional surveying technicians are needed: “I have to know where to get out,” he says, “a smart engineer with a bachelor’s degree is enough.”
KfW and GIZ were involved in setting up a technical university and a technical school in Palestine. They attach particular importance to practical relevance and sometimes also offer quick courses. “The robust technical machines and workshops (are) regularly used by a large number of students,” writes the KfW in project documents. KfW also recorded that “workers were able to gain further training through work (on KfW construction projects in Gaza).”
When asked, the press spokesman wrote that GIZ did not support any projects that promoted technical expertise in civil engineering. KfW says: “We have no information about a know-how transfer for tunnel construction.”
Where to put the excavation?
The engineers interviewed are puzzled about the excavation of the Hamas tunnels. Some things can be stored in ruins, hollows and fields. Distribution from moving dump trucks is possible. It involves tens of thousands of cubic meters of sand and light rock.
“Actually, the sand in these regions is not suitable for concrete because the grain strength is too low,” says civil engineer Lüking from the TH Lübeck.
KfW has been financing the construction of schools and health centers in the Gaza Strip for years. In the 723 individual projects, emphasis was placed on “local construction companies and the use of local building materials”. When asked, KfW had no knowledge of any misuse. She also refers to her robust controls.