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German security authorities have long been warning about increasing espionage from China. The current suspected cases show how real the danger of covert influence on politics currently is. How is China doing this?
There was a time when Chinese espionage was apparently not a big issue in Germany. At least there was a surprising lack of interest in their spying in this country. The Chinese simply did not appear in the annual Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution reports from 1982 to 1995. The federal governments at the time probably wanted it that way, perhaps because good relations with China were important – especially for the German economy.
Today, however, at least the tone of the security authorities has changed significantly. Thomas Haldenwang, head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), likes to use a comparison coined by his British counterpart from MI5: Russia is a storm, but China is climate change. That means: Beijing is now an almost unprecedented security challenge. And on many levels.
Espionage allegations against AfD employees
These days this is becoming clearer than ever: just early on Monday morning in Düsseldorf and Bad Homburg, a couple and a man were arrested who have been suspected for years of having a company structure that extends from London to Düsseldorf to China, technologies that can be used for military purposes and To have procured know-how – specifically for the Chinese foreign secret service, the Ministry of State Security (MSS). China denies the espionage allegations.
On Monday evening, the 43-year-old German-Chinese Jian G., a close associate of AfD MEP Maximilian Krah, was arrested in Dresden. The Federal Prosecutor General is investigating G. on suspicion of spying for Beijing. He is said to have “repeatedly revealed information about negotiations and decisions in the European Parliament” to China and spied on Chinese opposition members in Germany. The arrest took place because investigators believed that G. might be planning to flee abroad.
In the meantime, there have also been arrests in Great Britain: two Britons are said to have spied for China, one of the accused is a research assistant for the conservative Tory Party on the Foreign Affairs Committee.
China has noticeably increased activities
According to German security authorities, Beijing’s secret services have noticeably increased their activities in recent years. In the past, it was primarily classic economic and industrial espionage that caused problems for German companies. This included cyber attacks on large corporations whose products and development work China was interested in. But also to small, medium-sized “hidden champions”, i.e. companies that are among the world market leaders in a certain segment due to their particular innovative performance.
Recently, the focus has increasingly shifted to science. Universities and colleges have come under the radar of Chinese spies who want to steal valuable research results there. And not just through hackers who steal data, or through spies on social networks like LinkedIn who disguise themselves as business people or scientists, but simply through academic exchange, through collaborations, joint projects, guest professorships or students.
Students with close ties to Beijing
According to estimates, there are currently more than 40,000 Chinese students in the Federal Republic. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution assumes that a large proportion of these people have close ties to the Chinese state, for example through embassies, consulates and, above all, chat groups. This applies in particular to those who are sent to Germany through certain scholarship programs.
Military technology in focus
Beijing’s spies are said to be particularly interested in technologies that can be used militarily, for example propulsion technologies for rockets or cruise missiles, but also lasers, microchips, robotics and artificial intelligence systems. Often not only espionage is used, but also a transfer of know-how through company takeovers or direct investments.
In addition, according to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, China continues to spy on the exile community: opposition members, critics of the regime, representatives of the Uighur and Tibetan ethnic groups and the religious Falun Gong movement, which is banned in China.
Influencing EU politics
What the security authorities have also been noticing for some time now is that political espionage in Europe is becoming more important for China, and it is no longer just about secretly obtaining information, but about covert influence. For example, on German and European foreign, economic and security policy.
So far, three Chinese government agencies have been the focus of local counterintelligence: the Ministry of State Security, which is responsible for foreign espionage with its more than 100,000 employees, the Ministry of Public Security, which is responsible, among other things, for keeping an eye on Chinese exiles, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with its hacker units.
Espionage about Chinese Liaison office
However, a new actor is increasingly coming into play: the International Liaison Office of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC), which maintains a global network in the political spectrum, including through diplomatic missions, and is apparently involved in political processes with a lot of effort and money to influence Beijing.
“The IDCPC now acts de facto like an intelligence service of the People’s Republic of China and is therefore part of the Chinese intelligence service apparatus,” said the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. It is primarily about establishing and maintaining contacts with parties and members of parliament, especially those who have a “comparatively uncritical stance towards the Chinese government”. The long-term goal is to “move influential people to make statements and actions in line with the interests of the Chinese Communist Party.”
In Germany, covert and illegitimate influence by foreign states is not in itself a criminal offense. Only acting as an agent, for which proof of connection to a foreign secret service is necessary, and bribing elected officials is punishable.