Beijing’s relationship with Russia: “China is learning lessons from the war”

China is closely monitoring the events surrounding the Ukraine war, says Asia expert Stanzel in an interview tagesschau.de. The leadership is also concerned with its own stability – and the conflict with Taiwan.

tagesschau.de: Before the attack on Ukraine, Presidents Xi and Putin in Beijing vowed their “close friendship” and concluded a gas deal, among other things. Has this demonstratively emphasized proximity changed since then?

Angela Stanzel: The Russian invasion of Ukraine had no significant impact on this. The Chinese rhetoric coincides with the Russian narratives. There may have been minimal changes – but not to the point of causing a rupture in Sino-Russian relations. In essence, both regimes pursue the same interests. This remains unchanged despite the war.

tagesschau.de: Where are these common interests?

Punch: The main interest of both states is to undermine or change the Western-led global order in a way that suits the interests of Russia and China. Equally important is the strengthening of the respective authoritarian regime.

tagesschau.de: China has always recognized Ukraine’s right to sovereignty. Isn’t the Chinese leadership getting into a contradiction?

Punch: China resolves this contradiction by weaving its rhetoric between the two positions. However, the leadership has not yet spoken out against violating Ukrainian sovereignty. She deliberately ignores this factor and does not want to enter the dilemma.

China has maintained ties with Ukraine in the past and has economic interests in the country. The friendship with Russia is deeper, however, because common interests are considered more important. That is why China is so reluctant to condemn the war in Ukraine.

“Avoid negative economic effects”

tagesschau.de: How much does the war affect China’s economic interests?

Punch: Economically, the war and its effects hit China in a sensitive area. Not only as far as Ukraine is concerned, but above all the impact on the global economy as a whole. Official statements show that the Chinese leadership is genuinely concerned about the implications of the sanctions and how far China might be affected.

The leadership wants to avoid negative economic effects for its own population, because this in turn could endanger the survival of the regime.

“Minimal Public Language Changes”

tagesschau.de: Chinese state television reports on Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Does this point to contradictions within the system or to divergent interests?

Punch: We are actually seeing minimal changes in public language here, especially since the phone call between Xi Jinping and Joe Biden, in which the word war was used for the first time by the Chinese side and in which attacks were also explicitly called for for the first time to avoid civilian targets. Xi Jinping himself once again emphasized that China is always against wars in principle.

This slight softening that we are observing is probably a result of the vehement criticism not only from the USA, but from the western world as a whole. And of course also a result of the UN resolution, in which more states than ever before have condemned this war of aggression. China is trying to adapt minimally. It’s a small discrepancy that perhaps gives reason to hope that China could play a slightly more constructive role.

“Not ready for the role of mediator”

tagesschau.de: Do you think China would be able to exert significant influence on Russia?

Punch: China is perhaps the only country that could do that. If there is one country that can mediate and perhaps end the war, it is China. But the signals from Beijing are clear that China is currently not ready to play that role.

tagesschau.de: Is it also because China can identify with the Russian accusations against the West, especially against NATO and its alleged expansion?

Punch: The heart of China’s concern is real. She refers to the prospect of the US and then its allies expanding their security engagement in the Indo-Pacific, thereby restricting China’s freedom of movement and impeding China’s quest for hegemony in Asia. This is what drives the Chinese leadership. The signals China has received from Washington in recent years have been clear and have given China cause for concern.

“China is preparing for a contingency”

tagesschau.de: What does this conflict mean for China’s efforts to regain control of Taiwan? What conclusions can China draw from this?

Punch: On the one hand, China is aware that both cases are not 100% comparable, especially with regard to the US. Despite everything, Ukraine is far away for the USA and, above all, a European problem. Whatever happened to Taiwan, on the other hand, would happen on America’s doorstep. An invasion of Taiwan by China would therefore have a very different meaning for Washington. So I think China is very careful here about drawing any parallels or suggesting that there might be parallels.

But China is watching very closely how the West is reacting at the moment and is learning its lessons from it. And the fact that China has been trying for a long time to become more independent from the West, especially economically, is a sign that it is preparing for such an eventuality.

China’s drive to become independent of SWIFT in particular – which China is still a long way from achieving – is also an indication that China wants to cover itself for a similar event, so that it is not hit by Western sanctions in the way that Russia is currently. The unity that the West is now showing are also lessons that China is drawing for precisely this eventuality.

“China cannot completely decouple”

tagesschau.de: However, this could also mean that the current range of sanctions instruments may lose their effectiveness in a few years – let’s say 2030.

Punch: This is what China is working towards. The effectiveness depends on how far China can “decouple”. However, China has now realized that this is not entirely possible in today’s globally connected world of supply chains – no matter how much China may try to rely on the domestic market and on its own innovations. But diversification is of course possible.

If we assume that this is the case in 2030, then some sanctions may well not work as well as they might today. On the other hand, I think the western world would still have leverage. China cannot completely decouple itself.

The interview was conducted by Eckart Aretz, tagesschau.de