One attacked his old high school in Arras, the other attacked Swedish football fans who came to support their team in Brussels. If for the moment, there is nothing to indicate that the two terrorist attacks – perpetrated four days apart – are linked, the attackers claimed to be acting in the name of a single organization: the Islamic State. In Belgium, the police found videos of the suspect – a 45-year-old Tunisian, shot dead during his arrest – referring to it. The young Russian indicted for “assassination” in the Arras attack, for his part, recorded a video and an audio message in which he pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. “He expresses his contempt for other jihadist groups, notably Al-Qaeda,” said the national anti-terrorism prosecutor, Jean-François Ricard, on Tuesday.
How does this organization continue to attract radicalized individuals even though since the fall of its last bastion, Baghouz, recaptured by Syrian forces in March 2019, it no longer administers any territory, no longer has any population. Why do jihadists continue to kill in his name? How can we explain that the terrorist organization maintains such popularity? Interview with Myriam Benraad, professor of international relations at Schiller University and author of Is the Islamic State defeated? released in June by Editions CNRS.
How can we define the Islamic State today? This terrorist organization no longer has any territory or even a known leader. And yet, attacks in his name continue to be committed…
The military defeat suffered by the Islamic State is beyond doubt. Today we are dealing with an armed insurgency with a few thousand fighters still in Iraq and Syria. The organization is probably led by a rearguard of veterans, but there are no more charismatic figures like there were a few years ago. What remains, on the other hand, is a much more evanescent form of the movement: the Islamic State has succeeded in disseminating propaganda which has survived it, which still remains very strong in the collective imagination. Particularly thanks to social networks. The content is sophisticated, the propaganda messages are very well rehearsed, regularly recycled and regaining power in the light of international news.
In your opinion, has the conflict between Israel and Hamas rekindled the desire to take action in Europe?
It is clear that the terrorists in Arras and Brussels mentioned the conflict. The siege of Gaza, the number of civilian deaths, all this will materialize the message hammered out by the Islamic State. In their propaganda – and this was already the case with Al-Qaeda – the entire narrative revolves around humiliation and injustice. It is central because it is what motivates revenge. This conflict will make the speech more concrete and can create an environment conducive to taking action.
Despite its decline, does the Islamic State continue to appeal?
For now, the Islamic State, despite its military defeats, remains the main incarnation of global jihad. There are more localized groups, particularly in West Africa, but no movement is emerging at the international level. Moreover, it should be noted that the two terrorists spoke of the Palestinians in their messages but evacuated the role of Hamas. Claiming to be part of the Islamic State means affiliating with one of the major terrorist organizations; it is a way of legitimizing one’s action. The causes put forward are not new, IS is only repeating previous grievances. But obviously, we are talking about a very small, very radicalized minority. The Islamic State no longer has the means to organize commandos as was the case on November 13 or during the Brussels attacks; we are dealing with much more isolated acts.
Why have the vast majority of attacks perpetrated in Europe in recent years been in the name of the Islamic State and not, for example, Al-Qaeda?
There is a generational aspect. Al-Qaeda leaders are much older, they do not have the same mastery of digital tools. They seem a bit like old jihad backpackers even though fundamentally there are few ideological differences. The narrative around humiliation and revenge is very similar. The difference is that the Islamic State, in its propaganda, is younger, more offensive.
Does the power of the Islamic State therefore lie in its mastery of digital technology?
Before, jihadist propaganda was not just one click away, it was not accessible to everyone. You had to attend certain mosques, go to certain well-identified bookstores. The Islamic State revolutionized this by broadcasting very sophisticated videos on very accessible networks to disseminate its ideas, it managed to exploit the grievances of certain Muslims, relying on an Arab-Muslim world in full turmoil. He managed to poison more fragile minds. And these videos circulate almost freely. They are always accessible. There is no regulation and in my eyes, this is the main issue to fight against all this.