Alleged espionage for Russia: How the BND protects itself from moles

Status: 12/29/2022 7:05 p.m

What shouldn’t happen happened. A BND employee was probably spying – for Russia. It is still being determined. And the question arises as to how the secret service protects itself against moles. An ex-BND employee gives the answers.

By Michael Stempfle, ARD Capital Studio

The Attorney General is keeping a low profile. For tactical and security reasons, he apparently does not want to publish any interim results of the investigations into the alleged treason at the BND. Many questions arise, for example about the processes at the BND: How can the foreign intelligence service prevent secret information that is considered a state secret from leaving the BND and falling into Russian hands?

The former high-ranking BND employee Gerhard Conrad explained in an interview with the Federal Intelligence Service that there could be no round-the-clock surveillance ARD Capital Studio. These would also violate the personal rights of BND employees and create a destructive climate of mistrust.

Social live with Michael Stempfle, ARD Berlin, and Gerhard Conrad, ex-BND employee, on the espionage investigations against a BND employee

tagesschau24 2:00 p.m., 29.12.2022

Document theft about “dead mailboxes”

However, Conrad refers to safety precautions. For example, the BND generally noticed when information of this quality was copied to a USB stick. Even if the suspect is a high-ranking official with more extensive powers. Such incidents would be logged.

It is unlikely that the suspect would have passed on the documents as an email attachment. It is more likely that the documents were taken out of the house and, like in spy films, secretly deposited in so-called “dead mailboxes” – for the Russian addressee.

Look inside and outside

In order to prevent internal perpetrators at the BND, the service has always arranged security checks for applicants. These are regulated by law. A separate department called “Eigensicherung” not only questions whether the candidates are stable personalities, but also what their personal environment looks like. According to Conrad, such checks would be repeated over the course of a BND career. Apparently at longer intervals of up to ten years or for a given reason.

The chairman of the parliamentary control body, Konstantin von Notz from the Greens, had suggested clarifying whether these security checks needed to be improved. BND expert Conrad agrees. It’s worth checking out “where you can sharpen things up”. However, he pleads for a level-headed approach: Neither a witch hunt is recommended nor is there any false certainty.

It is important for Conrad that not only the BND looks inwards and outwards in the context of counter-espionage, but that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) also recognizes Russian espionage in Germany. This always succeeds. Based on the findings of the BfV, Germany was able to expel 40 Russian diplomats in April. It is important to be vigilant and to check whether Russian spies are approaching BND employees or politicians, for example, and want to recruit them.

mole in their own ranks

It is unclear what information the suspect passed on to Russia in the current case. But according to Conrad, it was “something that interested the Russians,” presumably the German perception of the course of the war in Ukraine.

WDR, NDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung had published that a friendly news service had informed the BND of a mole in their own ranks. If that turns out to be true, Conrad suspects that this secret service has apparently intercepted communications abroad. As is well known, such measures of satellite reconnaissance and communications monitoring were ramped up on a large scale at the beginning of the Ukraine war.

Conrad estimates that this friendly secret service must have noticed – more or less incidentally – that information from the BND had gotten into Russian hands. “Bycatch” is what the secret service says. As befits friendly secret services, the latter then warned the BND. A classic form of cooperation, “burden sharing”, says Conrad.

Blackmail is possible

The decisive factor for the question of how serious this case is now is to what extent and what quality the suspect disclosed information from the BND to Russia, and also how long this double agent activity lasted. That could only bring the investigation to light.

Investigators are also currently investigating whether the suspect was blackmailed by Russia before he possibly revealed a state secret to Moscow. In the world of spies, that’s entirely conceivable. From blackmail to threats to the family, nothing can be ruled out, explains Conrad. It is crucial for Moscow to know the vulnerability of a target person and then coordinate the measures.

If BND employees find themselves in a situation where they are approached or even blackmailed by foreign secret services, they can open up to their security department. They should do that as soon as possible, advises Conrad.

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