Afghanistan: KSK employed terrorism-related local worker


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Status: 03/01/2023 06:00 a.m

The elite KSK unit worked loudly BR with an Afghan who the secret services warned about. In August 2021, the Foreign Office evacuated him – although the Ministry of Defense opposed it. The ministries and the KSK remain silent.

By Rebecca Ciesielski, Arne Meyer-Fünffinger, Alexander Nabert and Maximilian Zierer, BR

During the Bundeswehr’s deployment in Afghanistan, the Special Forces Command (KSK) employed a man who was warned by several secret services. This emerges from internal documents from the Ministry of Defense and other documents that BR research present. The man worked as a security adviser for the KSK, despite being on a blacklist of potentially dangerous individuals and barred from working with Western allies. An internal memo by the ministry states “references to terrorism”.

Today the man lives in northern Germany. Among other things, he called himself Mohammed A. In his life he acted with different identities. When asked, he agreed to an interview BR-Reporters ready. Looking back on his work for the KSK, he said he was its “eyes and ears”. He translated and made assessments of the security situation.

Safety precautions disregarded?

A., he says, drove several times with KSK soldiers to the heavily guarded Bundeswehr camp in Mazar-i-Sharif. After BRresearch, there had been daily biometric access controls there. “I didn’t come in through the normal gate either, but in armored cars, in a convoy,” said A. In doing so, the KSK apparently disregarded the security precautions of the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF).

In the course of the chaotic evacuation mission from Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr brought the man to Germany. The Foreign Office had put him on an evacuation list at short notice and flown out of Kabul on August 17, 2021. The MAD had previously warned of A. several times. MAD also sent out a warning that day. Accordingly, the man had security concerns that spoke against entry into the Federal Republic.

The Foreign Office gave up BR-Request that security checks on the evacuated persons only take place in Germany due to the “extremely tense and unclear situation”. The Federal Police and the Ministry of the Interior did not want to comment on the process.

Dismissed as a local employee without notice

To the BR A. said he feared acts of revenge by the Taliban. In the weeks before the evacuation, the Ministry of Defense had wanted to prevent the man from entering the country. An internal note for the management level of the Ministry of Defense from October 2021 states that the “role of the KSK” is “unclear” in this case. Ministry officials believe his previous work for the KSK may have helped gain “access to the airport and the evacuation plane.”

Mohammed A. had already been in Germany as a young man. He committed several crimes. Courts convicted him of aggravated extortion and armed theft. After a short detention, the authorities deported him to Afghanistan in 2006. In 2008, the Bundeswehr hired him as a translator. A. hid the fact that he had lived in Germany for years. This emerges from data that MAD stored about him at the time. A. said dem BRthat he regrets his actions and has paid for them.

In November 2011, investigations by the MAD led to “safety-related findings”. The Bundeswehr then released A. without notice and put him on the ISAF blocked list. She classified A. as a “potential danger”. This was accompanied by the conditions “no access to properties, no employment at ISAF, disqualified for training for the army and police”.

Afghan intelligence agency warning

After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a visa for Germany, A. is said to have made a telephone threat to “a Springer publishing house employee against the Federal Republic of Germany” on December 23, 2014. That’s what the memo from the Department of Defense says.

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution found out about the conversation. It is unclear where. The protection of the constitution informed the MAD. He forwarded the information to the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. In a report, the military intelligence service warned “of a possible threat to German facilities in Afghanistan from A.”

To the BR A. said he was on the phone with a journalist from the “Bild” newspaper at the time. He said he had received many offers from the Taliban. “If I had worked for the other side, it could have banged so hard that the heath shook.” However, he declined these offers.

In March 2015, the Bundeswehr received another, more specific warning. The Afghan domestic secret service sent the information that A. “plans to carry out an attack together with the Taliban against the German embassy in Kabul” or other German targets. A. said dem BR: “I have no idea about that.” He only got through the BR-Reporters found out about the allegation. “If that was the case, why wasn’t I arrested?”

Advisor for the KSK – despite employment ban

Despite being on the blacklist and warnings from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, MAD and the Afghan secret service, A. worked for the Germans again a few years later: the KSK hired the man as a consultant for a few months in 2018. In 2021, the elite troop employed him again. The last contract is up to him BR before. According to the report, the Afghan received a total of $10,000 in fees for almost two and a half months for “advice on the current security situation”.

In the note from the Ministry of Defense, the employees state that the KSK did not request the MAD to check the man and did not report his activity. It can be assumed that the KSK was aware of A.’s personal background in the course of continued employment. “From a local point of view, the role of the KSK, which is still unclear, has management relevance.” The document was sent to the head of the ministry. The Department of Defense allowed questions from the BR on the case unanswered. The KSK did not want to comment on the allegations when asked.

The case is now in the hands of the Afghanistan investigative committee. Clara Bünger (Die Linke) said that BR on the KSK’s actions: “I’m surprised that he received a contract from the KSK despite the ban. This makes it clear that the KSK didn’t adhere to certain rules during the period.” CDU MP Thomas Röwekamp said that BR: “It must have been a mistake by the KSK. You can see that in the reactions of the Ministry of Defence. That shouldn’t have happened.”

Shortly after arriving in Germany, a KSK soldier is said to have offered Mohammed A. the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution as an informant. However, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution dealt with A. in a different way: On September 16, 2021, several security authorities discussed the case in the joint counter-terrorism center. The authorities recorded that the police state protection is responsible for A. To the BR said A. that he was not a danger. The state security classifies him according to information from the BR not as a threat – but still has him on the screen today.

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