The Bundeswehr tweeted four photos to the world on June 5, 2021: They show Brigadier General Ansgar Meyer, then commander of the German troops in Afghanistan, as he leads Afghan General Mustafa Wardak through Camp Marmal, the German military camp near Mazar-i-Sharif. They are preparing “the smooth handover of the property to the Afghan armed forces,” says the tweet. The Germans are withdrawing from the north of the country, where they were responsible for security for years.
The Afghans shouldn’t be happy at the base for long: a good two months after the appointment, Wardak’s unit surrendered to the Taliban. But when it was foreseeable for the German government that the Afghan armed forces and the government of President Ashraf Ghani would collapse and the Taliban would take the country on the Hindu Kush in a surprise attack is one of the central questions that is now being asked Committee of Inquiry of the Bundestag wants to clarify.
This Thursday, the MPs, chaired by SPD MP Ralf Stegner, will begin their substantive work, which will cover the period from the conclusion of the so-called Doha Agreement between the USA and the Taliban on February 29, 2020 to four weeks after the catastrophic days in Kabul in August 2021, when the troops of the NATO countries hastily withdrew in a military evacuation operation – leaving behind thousands of Afghan local workers who had worked for Western governments and since then some have probably had to fear for their lives.
The Germans were aware that the withdrawal of Western troops could play into the hands of the radical Islamists, as evidenced by federal government files available to the committee. Already in a note from the Federal Ministry of Defense from December 2020, classified as “classified information, only for official use”, the WDR and Southgerman newspaper as other documents could see, it says that “images of flight” should be “avoided”. But that requires an “orderly transfer back” – but the Department of Strategy and Deployment of the Ministry considers the probability of this to be “very low” given the strict specifications of the Americans even then.
“To avoid images of an escape”
Months later, at a staff meeting on May 11, 2021, the topic came up again. “In order to avoid images of an escape: Application by the contingent to hand over CM to the 209th ANA Corps,” says the log, which is also in the files. CM stands for Camp Marmal, the encampment. The 209th Corps is General Wardak’s unit. “Images of the escape are to be avoided in any case – and are relevant to management,” is noted elsewhere, in bold type, with three exclamation marks. Everything should look calm, like nobody has anything to worry about.
The Camp Marmal episode is one of many that can be reconstructed from the tens of thousands of documents the committee has to sift through in its multi-year work. It is far too early for final assessments, but the broad outlines of political decision-making processes in Berlin and at international level can be traced – which in some ways resemble the story of the military camp.
US special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad is negotiating the deal with the Taliban alone. The international partners who depend on the US presence in Afghanistan are informed but not consulted. “We should demand more transparency and involvement from Washington,” the embassy in Kabul cabled to Berlin, referring to the withdrawal of Western troops a few days after the agreement was signed.
The diplomats warned that the agreement contained “nothing about a continued reduction in violence by the Taliban”. The Taliban have “not committed to anything” other than fighting terrorism, but have been given a “clear timeline” for withdrawal. The conclusion is that they just have to wait and see.
Civil war as the most likely option
The Taliban’s violence and the divisions within the Afghan government are consistently identified by the departments as problems for the desired peace process. “Continuation of military struggle” by the Taliban appears in the Defense Ministry’s scenarios shortly after the conclusion of the agreement, as does “permanent civil war”, the latter variant marked in green: one of the most likely options.
The federal government hopes to be able to change Washington’s approach again after the presidential election in the USA in November 2020. Because either the domestic political pressure is then removed from Donald Trump. Or his competitor Joe Biden corrects the course. The Federal Foreign Office is soliciting NATO supporters to make the withdrawal dependent on progress in the peace process and the situation in Afghanistan. Germany will not assert itself with this.
In order to influence the Afghan parties to the conflict, Berlin is considering acting as an organizer and mediator for peace negotiations – the government in Kabul, largely ignored by US negotiator Khalilzad in the negotiations with the Taliban, is approaching the Germans with this as a wish.
The Federal Foreign Office is already urging the Federal Government in spring 2021 to make it easier for local workers to enter Germany by issuing visas on arrival, but the Federal Government is not preparing for a real crisis scenario for a possible collapse of the state and the evacuation of thousands of people. On the contrary: The Ministry for Economic Cooperation assumes that it will continue development aid in Afghanistan even after the withdrawal.
Many are no longer in office
The Foreign Office plans to maintain a diplomatic presence. As recently as August 10, a senior official at the agency’s Crisis Response Center wrote in an email to colleagues: “Run out on some kind of return campaign for Afghanistan.” Five days later, the Taliban took over the Afghan capital, Kabul, and desperate people clung to US military planes as they took off.
Those who were politically responsible in Germany at the time are no longer in office today. Chancellor Angela Merkel is retired, as is Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. Foreign Minister Heiko Maas is a simple member of the Bundestag. However, senior political officials could come into focus. Jens Plötner, for example, the security policy adviser to Chancellor Olaf Scholz, then political director at the Federal Foreign Office. Or Bruno Kahl, the President of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND). The committee will therefore have to concentrate primarily on the lessons for “powers, organization, work and cooperation and for avoiding mistakes in the departments involved in the federal government and its subordinate authorities,” as the decision to appoint says.
info box
Difficult reconnaissance
The Afghanistan investigative committee wants to hear the first witnesses very soon: Three employees of the Federal Ministry of Defense who were involved in compiling situation reports and diplomats from the Federal Foreign Office have been invited. In order to prepare the survey, the MPs depend on files. However, crucial stocks are still outstanding, although the MPs requested them before the summer break. The Chancellery is just as defaulting as the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The parliamentarians are particularly annoyed that the Federal Intelligence Service has only provided a fraction of the material in question. According to the service, more than 20,000 documents could be relevant. They are predominantly subject to secrecy and are therefore only provided on paper, blackened out by hand. In the meantime, the BND has assigned 25 people to it. BND boss Bruno Kahl, 60, who was appointed by Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2016, also faces criticism that his house has not recognized the seriousness of the situation for far too long. SZ