A month of war in Ukraine: “blatant deficiencies on a tactical level”

Four weeks after the attack on Ukraine, Russia has “not at all achieved its military goals,” says analyst Gady. Which places are decisive for the course of the war – and why the combat effectiveness of Ukraine is difficult to assess.

tagesschau.de: What did Russia achieve in Ukraine in four weeks?

Franz Stefan Gady: It is quite clear that the Russian troops have in no way achieved the military goals set at the beginning of this war. The idea of ​​overthrowing the government of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy or bringing about a quick regime change was militarily unrealistic. The Russian army attacked across too many axes, the troops were too scattered. The entire operational concept was difficult to understand in the first few days because it was contrary to their military doctrine.

The Russian Armed Forces obviously did not expect to have to wage a high-intensity war against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Rather, they had expected a scenario like Austria in 1938 – a quick occupation, then by the German Wehrmacht, supported by the approval of a large part of the population. Instead, they must now wage a grueling battle.

Poor coordination, poor communication

tagesschau.de: Did the Russian leadership change its war aims as a result?

Gady: The Russian armed forces are currently regrouping and adapting to the individual fronts with new combat approaches. However, the individual army groups that are advancing are poorly coordinated with one another and apparently have difficulty communicating with one another through encrypted systems. It could be that Russia will try to conquer as many territories as possible with a new offensive to use at the negotiating table.

tagesschau.de: Do the individual fronts differ?

Gady: In the south, Russian troops made the most gains, and this is where some of their best units were deployed. Ukraine, on the other hand, has had relatively few units here and has withdrawn them inland.

In the north, the march was faltering because there are no railway networks, especially in the north-west. Supplies had to be brought down by truck. It was therefore to be expected that there would be logistical problems here. There was also strong resistance here.

Role model Iraq war?

tagesschau.de: Isn’t it amazing that the Russian armed forces didn’t expect it?

Gady: If the Russian army had expected this, they would have integrated various weapon systems and platforms beforehand in order to achieve the best possible effect against the enemy and to protect their own troops from enemy action. Russia’s approach here is also similar to the risky tactics used by the US army before Baghdad in 2003, when the US army penetrated deep into enemy space uncovered and without support because the opposing army’s morale was already destroyed and the regime did not have the support of the local population became. Here, at the tactical level, glaring shortcomings have appeared in the Russian army. As military analysts, we overestimated the impact of Russian army reforms after the 2008 war in Georgia.

It was to be assumed that the Russian troops would sooner or later have logistical problems because the tactical battalion troops, in contrast to NATO units, need more logistics because they have more firepower and therefore more ammunition needs. Above all, the Russian armed forces are not designed for an offensive war with deep thrusts into enemy territory. Rather, they are geared to waging a defensive-offensive war on Russian soil using the domestic rail network.

The problem of Ukraine in the south

tagesschau.de: How important is the resistance in Mariupol for the course of the war?

Gady: In the coming days it will be important how quickly Mariupol falls and what is happening in Donbass. This is where the Ukrainian armed forces currently have their biggest operational problem, this is where they could be encircled. There is a thrust of the Russian army south of Kharkiv and north of Mariupol. We do not know how many Ukrainian units are still there. Originally nine brigades were stationed there. We know much less about the Ukrainian armed forces than about the Russian ones. It is therefore very difficult to deduce how long the war will last.

tagesschau.de: What happens if the Ukrainian units in the east are encircled?

Gady: If these units are cut off and Mariupol falls, that would free up additional Russian troops that can be deployed or redeployed to other fronts, e.g. threatening Mykolaiv or Odessa, or reinforcing the circling ring around Kyiv. Although I can imagine that the city will be surrounded sooner or later – but I can’t imagine that the Russians currently have the ability and the men to take this city in house-to-house combat. It took too many attackers to do that. Instead, they will increasingly rely on the use of artillery and shell the city, and thereby perhaps be able to wrest a few political concessions from the Zelenskyi government.

Few data on Ukraine’s army

tagesschau.de: How much longer can the Ukrainian army hold out?

Gady: That’s the problem: we don’t know what condition the Ukrainian armed forces are in. Therefore, all analyzes should be treated with caution because one large variable cannot be recorded. We know that Ukrainian anti-aircraft defenses are still intact, we know that a large number of formations are still operational, we know that they still have operational reserves. But we have no idea what the ammunition reserves are, we don’t know whether the western supplies are actually arriving in the desired quantities, we also don’t know to what extent the Ukrainians are adapting to new tactical circumstances, we have very little insight into the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian Air Force.

tagesschau.de: Can the losses be estimated?

Gady: We don’t know the loss figures. One has to assume that Ukrainian casualties are not far inferior to Russian ones – perhaps slightly less because they are defending rather than attacking. But the counterattacks of the Ukrainians are costly for them too, because they have no more control over the integration of the various branches of the army than the Russians. In an intense war, casualties can easily number in the thousands, and that was to be expected.

Today it looks as if we are going into a new phase of the war of attrition, where the front lines will only shift slightly, more cities will be encircled, more artillery will be used and this can lead to much larger losses. I don’t think Russian or Ukrainian forces will collapse anytime soon. But that doesn’t mean that the Ukrainians will win either. Based on current data, we are approaching a stalemate situation.

“Keep up arms shipments”

tagesschau.de: What should the West do now?

Gady: By and large, the West’s response is correct. The most important thing the West can do right now is keep the arms supply going. We must ensure that the most effective systems get into the hands of the Ukrainian armed forces. I don’t think much of no-fly zones because it doesn’t make any military sense for a number of reasons. It is important to support Ukraine financially – and to do something for the many refugees and to alleviate the humanitarian problems.

tagesschau.de: Do you expect a negotiated solution?

Gady: Sooner or later there will have to be a negotiated solution in which both sides give up something. It will be important for Russia and Ukraine to be able to create a narrative in which both sides have gained something. I doubt whether this can bring about long-term peace. There may be another conflict in the near future.

The conversation was led by Eckart Aretz, tagesschau.de