Sauli Niinistö, the President of Finland, was recently asked what others can learn from his country for dealing with Russia. Finland and its large neighbor are linked by a border of 1,340 kilometers and a history of suffering. Yet it is known for a long tradition of balancing that goes back to the Cold War era. So it can’t hurt to seek advice from Finland while a Russian deployment of troops worries Ukraine and the world. Finland is counting on partnerships, including with NATO, replied Niinistö. It is an advocate of multilateralism and tries to work well with Russia. Above all, however, the President stressed, Finland was “well armed”.
This answer leads right into the new world and possibly also into the thinking of Olaf Scholz. The responsibility of preventing a new war in Eastern Europe rests on the new Chancellor from the very first days of his term in office. Not on his own, of course, but with the end of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship, Germany has not lost its central role in Western Russia policy. As little time as Scholz can take in the fight against the pandemic, there is also little time left to take the place in the hot crisis diplomacy that is reserved for a German Chancellor.
He cites Helmut Schmidt, not just Willy Brandt
So far, Scholz has cited the example of the 1970s in all his statements on the crisis in Eastern Europe, when détente with the Soviet Union was possible under the most difficult of circumstances. Here he meets with the Finn Niinistö, who would like to revive the spirit that led to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. When Scholz refers to this policy, however, it is noticeable that he is not only referring to Willy Brandt, which is part of good foreign policy in the SPD, but always also to Helmut Schmidt. So on Brandt, the founder of Ostpolitik, but also on Schmidt, who remained an advocate of nuclear deterrence in the dispute over the NATO double resolution. In this way, Scholz places himself in the tradition of social democratic détente, but eludes its glorification, which is popular in parts of the SPD.
This suggests that Scholz, like the Finnish President, recognizes the prerequisites for dialogue in his own strength and determination. It is true that the Chancellor has remained vague so far. He merely pointed out that existing borders must remain inviolable, and he also avoided the threat that the German-Russian Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline could not go into operation. But when he says that a possible Russian attack on Ukraine will have completely different consequences as a “dramatic violation of the rules”, it becomes clear that Scholz has no illusions about the depth of the conflict that then threatened.
On the basis of this knowledge, the new Chancellor has no choice but to close ranks with American President Joe Biden. Europeans may complain that Biden has taken the lead, but they have to admit that it won’t work without the US. Angela Merkel has failed in the last few weeks of her term in office in an attempt to revive the Normandy format from Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia. There is little to suggest that Scholz can be more successful right from the start of his chancellorship. It is all the more important that the Europeans now try to work together with the USA to avert the threat of war.
The claim that there is not enough talk with Russia has always been wrong
This attempt can only consist of two parts, in each of which Scholz will have to play a role. On the one hand, the western world must agree that an invasion of Ukraine would have economic consequences for Russia that overshadow everything that was imposed after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian-fueled war in Donbass. On the other hand, Russian President Vladimir Putin must and will be talked to – in every promising format. The claim that there is not enough talk to Russia has always been false anyway.
It is true that we cannot talk about everything with Russia. This is because not everything is negotiable for the democracies of the West – unlike for autocracies. Russia demands that NATO withdraw its promise of an open door in principle for Ukraine and Georgia. The Russian leadership knows very well, of course, that both countries have no real prospect of acceptance in the foreseeable future. Rather, it is about bringing both of them back into Moscow’s zone of influence. That would be nothing more than a dictation. Anyone who thinks this is the way to secure peace has learned the lessons of the 20th century badly. It is good that the new German Chancellor is referring to precisely these lessons.