Interview on election results: “Almost a declaration of bankruptcy”

The social and age structure, the feeling of being disadvantaged compared to West Germans and hardly any active participation in politics: Görlitz social scientist Raj Kollmorgen gives reasons for the AfD’s strong performance.

tagesschau24: Mr. Kollmorgen, the AfD has won many state elections recently, but it is the strongest force in Thuringia for the first time. Do you think the reasons for this are more a kind of frustration with the traffic light coalition or are they more likely to be due to negative experiences since reunification?

Raj Kollmorgen: I would like to think of both together. The fact that many citizens in both federal states have had experiences during the transformation and the unification period, and not only good ones, has led to a different basic attitude towards the traffic light coalition. And that makes them criticize the traffic light coalition’s policies in a completely different way – more radically, that is.

Two federal states with Similarities

tagesschau24: In Saxony, where you live, the CDU comes in first place, in Thuringia it is the AfD. There, almost one in three eligible voters is convinced by the Höcke-AfD. Is there anything special about Thuringia?

Kollmorgen: I would first compare the two states and say that they have much more in common than they have differences. The two states, even though Saxony is almost twice as large in terms of population, are very close to each other – not just regionally and geographically. The special thing is the proximity to the border, as far as Thuringia is concerned. There was a more intensive exchange, and even more commuting to the old states, especially in the 1990s and early 2000s.

I believe that the geographical location and the somewhat more rural nature of Thuringia and, to that extent, a different kind of conservatism in large parts of Thuringia are important reasons why parts of the population are more open to the AfD.

Age structure plays an important role

tagesschau24: What role does the age structure of the population play?

Kollmorgen: Of course the age structure plays a role, and not an unimportant one. Thuringia is a little older than Saxony. Of course the social structure and the demographic structure are two very important factors in voting behavior. Older people obviously perceive the problems of the present differently. It is more about questions of security, crime, the question of how safe you feel when you go out on the street in the evening. It is about questions of public services, medical services, infrastructure plays a very important role.

This is not so pronounced among younger people. And we have a different perception of the problem against the background of our own history, our own biography. The experiences that were made in the 1990s and early 2000s are incorporated into the assessment of current politics. In this respect, age plays a very important role in voting decisions and political orientations and attitudes.

Strong protest stance

tagesschau24: I would sum it up under the term “transformation shock”. Between 1990 and 1995, around 75 percent of people in the East lost their jobs – as a result of reunification. And this of course means that the financial situation is completely different to that in West Germany. Nevertheless, the question remains, why is there so much focus on overarching federal political issues? The impression is that the state political issues were completely overshadowed, as one of the SPD’s top candidates also said.

Kollmorgen: This is linked to the basic constellation. And East Germans tend to develop a stronger protest attitude and also incorporate this into their decision-making and political activities. In other words: they are even less tied to parties and associations. This means that they tend to move around on the outside and look at the entire political process. They are less actively involved in the classic forms of political participation. That is one side of the coin.

And the other side is a system perspective that is much more likely than in West Germany to ask whether the system as a whole is working. That means that people don’t just talk about local politics or state politics, but ask the question relatively quickly: is the system actually working as it should? Is it just a matter of individual actors failing because they haven’t developed the right political program, or is the system as a whole not working? I’m deliberately putting it this way from a radical populist perspective: are the elites as a whole corrupt, are they no longer listening to the people? Far more East Germans than West Germans perceive this. The ratio is roughly one to two. So in East Germany, twice as many people tend to blame the system and to formulate a fundamental criticism of the elites overall.

Feeling of devaluation and dispossession

tagesschau24: And how does that happen?

Kollmorgen: On the one hand, this can be explained by the history of the East German states, that is, the history that goes back further into the past and begins long before 1990. Of course, it is precisely these older people, who are so strongly represented as a group, who are still directly and subsequently influenced by the GDR in both federal states.

On the other hand, they had the experience of transformation and unification policy, and many felt systematically set back, devalued, devalued, even dispossessed. In other words, they perceived it as the West German elites and West German companies rushing through the country and leaving no stone unturned. And that they also showed no interest in how the East Germans were actually doing.

And a critique of the system is certainly obvious against both backgrounds – that is, against the background of the GDR, the revolutionary overcoming, the fact that a system had already been actively overthrown. And against the background of the fundamental criticism of the transformation and unification policy after 1990. You have a different fundamental perspective on the possibilities, the alternatives of political systems in general.

Less Duisburg, more Konstanz

tagesschau24: Now we have talked a lot about the criticism of the system. At the same time, it must be noted that the economic situation in Thuringia, for example, is not that bad, nor is the average income. And although there is a lot of talk about migration and asylum policy, the proportion of foreigners in both Saxony and Thuringia is extremely low compared to the rest of the country. Feelings and reality don’t always match up, do they?

Kollmorgen: On the one hand, yes. On the other hand, perhaps no. So yes, because you are absolutely right that the situation is better in many ways, economically and socially, than one would think, or even should think, from the many criticisms and positions expressed. But here we are again with this fundamental attitude of protest and criticism, which is rarely translated into active participation.

One of the latest surveys has shown that around three quarters of the East German electorate believe that they cannot seriously influence political issues through their own political activity. For a democratic political system, this is almost a declaration of bankruptcy.

And the other is the direct comparison with West Germans. When many East Germans think of West Germany, they tend not to look at Duisburg, Gelsenkirchen or the Saarland, but rather think of Konstanz and Hamburg-Blankenese. And there they see a wealth and a functioning middle class that they believe they cannot find in East Germany. They see themselves as devalued and dispossessed, as not being treated equally to West Germans. Two thirds to three quarters of the electorate still see themselves as second-class citizens in certain respects. And that has an impact on how they assess their own situation.

The interview was conducted by Jan Starkebaum for tagesschau24. It was edited for the written version.