Disinformation – the creeping danger before the European elections

Rumors, misinformation and influencing candidates: countries like Russia and China are trying in different ways to influence the EU election. How is the EU preparing itself for this?

Hate, threats, intimidation: disinformation and manipulation have many faces in Brussels politics. The threat is increasing ahead of the European elections – and it has many facets.

The EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) has identified several strategies of destabilization and disinformation for the European elections. The agency considers a cyber attack on the voting process and the transmission of results to be unlikely because falsified results can be quickly corrected.

More dangerous is the underlying uncertainty among citizens caused by disinformation campaigns designed to influence voters and delegitimize the election.

The focus will be on the topics of Ukraine, climate, migration, energy prices and gender. The aim is to control online discourses and manipulate debates in the digital election campaign.

The example of Spain

An attempted manipulation shortly before the Spanish parliamentary elections last July showed how this can work.

Two days before the vote, the online portal of the city of Madrid was hacked with the message that the Basque terrorist organization ETA, which was dissolved in 2018, was back and was planning attacks on polling stations. It was a perfidious reference to events from previous election campaigns, when there had been terrorist acts by ETA – with the clear aim of stirring up fear.

Two states as actors

Before the European elections, the focus is primarily on Russia and China. EU Commission Vice President Vera Jourova warned the European Parliament against attempts by the leadership in Moscow to influence the election: “The Kremlin will try to divide Europe with disinformation, corruption and other dirty tricks. European voters deserve to exercise their right to vote with the help of verifiable facts and not unfounded narratives.”

The concern is based on successful disinformation campaigns by Russia in the past, such as the Kremlin narrative after the attack on Ukraine that Western sanctions were to blame for the disruption of the global supply of grain and a food crisis. The fact that this crisis was caused by the attack on Ukraine and the blockade of Ukrainian Black Sea ports from which the grain had been exported until then was to be covered up by this campaign.

Commission countermeasures

The EU diplomatic service set up a task force to combat disinformation years ago in order to be able to respond more quickly to such campaigns and not to hand over the power of interpretation to foreign intelligence services. More than 750 cases of targeted disinformation by foreign actors, primarily from Russia, have been collected so far.

An EU rapid alert system against disinformation is intended to ensure that such campaigns are identified more quickly before they can spread across Europe.

The responsibility of Facebook & Co.

At the same time, the EU Commission expects tech companies and internet platforms to react even more sensitively to the threat and to allocate more staff to deal with disinformation.

However, Meta, X and Google have already drawn conclusions from the US election fraud debacle and have also developed “election integrity guidelines” for the European elections: fake accounts are to be quickly identified and removed. The basis is the new EU Digital Services Act (DSA). It obliges providers to better protect users from manipulation and fake news.

EU Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton called on the platforms to “ensure a free and fair information environment – from moderating content to using credible sources”.

Influencing the interior of Parliament

ENISA considers direct influence on politicians and their environment to be even more dangerous. The EU agency accuses Russia of providing “tailor-made programs” that discreetly support pro-Russian forces in the European Parliament.

For example, AfD Bundestag member Peter Bystron, who is second on the party’s list of candidates for the European elections, is suspected of having accepted money from pro-Russian networks. In May, the Bundestag lifted the parliamentarian’s immunity, after which the Munich public prosecutor’s office launched an investigation and had several properties searched.

The MEP and lead candidate of the AfD, Maximilian Krah, is suspected of having received funds from pro-Russian networks. In the Krah case – and not only here – It is also about China: His parliamentary staff member is accused of spying for China. He was arrested in April.

Since then, the AfD has been in turmoil – and the EU Parliament has once again been shown the challenges it faces.

Spanish EU chief diplomat Josep Borell describes the dangers as follows: “Disinformation is not a bomb that can kill you, but a poison that attacks your thinking – one of the greatest security threats of our time.”